

A VINDICATION

Of Our Present

ROYAL FAMILY

Principally with regard to

HANOVER.

In which the

CONDUCT of King George I. relating to Sweden, Mecklenburg, and the Czar Peter I. is particularly Vindicated, in Answer to several Papers and late Pamphlets on these Subjects, but more especially one, Intitled,

The English Nation Vindicated, &c.

Containing a long insulting MEMORIAL from the Czar's Resident in 1719; which is here fully Answered and Confuted, from undoubted Testimonies.

By a Friend to Hanover, tho' an Englishman.

L O N D O N :

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VINDICATION



CONTAINS A LONG AND
PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT OF COMMONS

IN THE CASE OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX

AGAINST THE
PEOPLE OF THE
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX

IN THE YEAR 1857

BY JAMES M. COLEMAN

ESQ. OF THE
MIDDLESEX ASSIZES

LONDON: PUBLISHED BY
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A

VINDICATION, &c.

THO' infinite Pains has been used of late in Pamphlets, Journals, Speeches, and even in P——ts, to propagate the invidious Distinction of *Englishmen*, and *Hanoverians*, for Purposes, if not treasonable, which are certainly seditious, I am neither ashamed or afraid of owning myself a Friend to *Hanover*, and an Advocate for our Royal Family in promoting the Interest of their Hereditary Dominions, consistent with their Obligations to these Nations. I have waited impatiently to see an abler Pen undertake the Glorious Cause; but finding the Enemies of the Succession grow immeasurably insolent and audacious from the Silence and Lenity of the Government and its Friends, I venture to enter the Lists in behalf of my Sovereign and his Royal Family, because I think it my Duty and Interest, tho' conscious of my own Inability.

It is high Time that we, the Friends of the *Succession*, should *unite*, when the Alarm for *Union* amongst its *Enemies*, is sounded throughout the Nation. There is not a paltry hackney Writer, who subsists in his Garret, by a weekly Stipend, which is increas'd in Proportion to the *Quantum* of *Sedition* he propagates, but preaches up this *Union* in Opposition to the Measures of the most benevolent, gracious,

and intrepid Prince in the World. ' Let us *unite* in
 ' it therefore, says a late * *Journal*, against the *next*
 ' *Opposition* (if that should ever happen) and found,
 ' NO HANOVERIAN TROOPS! in the Ears of every
 ' Man who can contribute to our Relief. '

The intelligent Reader can't but observe, that this Incendiary's alarming to *Union* at this Juncture, in regard to the Troops of the Electorate in our Pay, is a complicated Crime. 'Tis manifestly propagating Disaffection to His Majesty, and disrespect to the *Legislature*, especially that Branch of it, which in virtue of its Power, had voted the Sum necessary for defraying the Expence of that Corps of Troops for the next Year. This Vote, and the Resolutions of both Houses in Favour of this Measure, which were previous to this Scribler's Alarm to *Union* against this very Measure, is at once the Demonstration and the Reproach of that unlimited Freedom we enjoy, and of the Lenity and Goodness of that King, that Government, and that Legislature, which modern Writers are hired to traduce and defame.

Besides many occasional *Defamers* of Majesty and the Legislature, the Author of the aforesaid *Journal*, and one of his † Colleagues of the Week, out-do all that ever went before them in Virulence, Scandal and Insolence. I should fill a Volume did I attempt quoting the seditious Insolent, even treasonable Paragraphs of this latter, tho' it be of scarce a Year's standing. In a late Paper, he has the Arrogance to charge the King, in the Persons of his Servants, with *insolently daring* to pursue Measures, which this important Author, who takes upon himself to answer for, and represent the whole People of this extended Island, dislikes and disapproves **.——' So bold and ' insolent are our M——rs become, and so low and despi-

* *Westminster Journal* of 28 Jan. 1744.

† *Old England*.

** *Ibid.* Of 21 Jan. 1744.

' despicable the People, that tho' they know we are
 ' exasperated (*in the plural Number forsooth*) to a ve-
 ' ry great Degree, they *dare* exasperate us yet far-
 ' ther, in Defiance of our Complaints, in Defiance of
 ' Resentments.—Divided and weaken'd *at home*,
 ' they have *dar'd* to embroil us, unally'd and unassif-
 ' ted, *abroad*; engaged in one War of *our own*, they
 ' have *dar'd* to plunge us into another, in which we
 ' have not the least visible *Concern*: The first they
 ' have *dar'd* to neglect, and the last they have *dar'd*
 ' to make the sole Subject of their Care; and not
 ' only so, but to carry on the most unpopular Mea-
 ' sures, by the most unpopular *Means*, and which
 ' must unavoidably produce the most fatal Conse-
 ' quences. '

I have been at the Pains of transcribing more of
 this flagrant Incendiary's Works than perhaps the
 dispassionate Reader will thank me for, because this
 single Quotation includes all the Objections of our
Malecontents, and contains the most important *Reasons*
 assign'd by this doughty Scribler, * *why Matters can't*
go right, till Things are put upon a Broad-Bottom; that
 is, till this Writer and his Friends are taken into the
 Ministry; and why, if His Majesty should refuse to
 be forced by such dutiful Members of this same
Broad-Bottom, as this Author is, *some Body should not*
be sent a Grazing, &c.

Those concern'd in this Weekly Packet of Scan-
 dal and Sedition, affect to have it thought to come
 from the Pen of one of high Rank and Consequence,
 but I can never believe it; and, therefore, if any of
 the Authors of these Journals shou'd be offended at
 my supposing that they are the hired Hacks either of
 greedy Tradesmen, or *disappointed Patriots*, be it my
 Excuse, that I can't think it possible for any Man,
 who wou'd be deem'd a Gentleman, to suffer such
 bare-faced

* *Old-England*, 28 Jan. 1744.

bare-faced Sedition, Scandal and Insolence to drop from his Pen, which he would be ashamed to speak before his Equals, and afraid to utter in the Presence of his Superiors.

A Gentleman, or Man of *Rank*, having a Stake in the Land, and acting upon honest Principles, and with true Patriot Views, reasons on public Measures and Occasions with Calmness and Moderation; expresses his Fears for his Country with Decency and Concern, but not without *Hopes* that they are groundless; and is ready and willing to be convinced that his Fears are unnecessary: But with the disappointed Statesman, the discontented Zealot and Incendiary, it is the direct contrary. The first Step he takes is to fix on some one Man in the Administration, whom he supposes to stand in his Way to Power; next to vow his particular Destruction, and the Fall of all such as co-operate with him. To this End, this Sham-patriot shall make Use of any Arguments, any Reasons, any Means or Artifice to execute his Scheme. Truth or Falshood are to him Things purely indifferent, unless as to their Tendency to answer the Purpose of his Revenge and Ambition. The Welfare or Destruction of his Country, for which he wou'd seem to bleed, bears no Proportion in his jaundiced Mind, to the Success or Ruin of the Minister he would displace. He triumphs in the midst of Clamour, Discontent and Confusion, is elated at Civil Discord, and he can't be more mortified than at the Success of his Prince or his Country, and is capable of feeling no Pain so accute, as the being obliged to own, that the Laws are the Measure of the Conduct of both Prince and Ministers; and that through their Care, his native Soil enjoys all the Blessings of Peace, Plenty and Liberty.

Tho' every Feature of this Picture resembles a supposed *Author* of one of those flagacious weekly Lucubrations, I don't expect he will own it to be his, and therefore

therefore I may hope not to fall so far under his Displeasure, as to draw the Gall of his Pen upon me, with which it abounds more than any extant : But that he may see I intend him greater Deference than to any of his hepdomidal Fellow-Labourers, I will do him the Honour to suppose for a Moment, that he means as he writes or speaks, and examine the Weight of his Objections to the present Measures as he has stated them in those Quotations I borrowed from him.

‘ The Ministry, says this *Dimmock*, knows we are *exasperated* to a very great Degree, yet they *dare* exasperate us further, in Defiance of our *Complaints* and *Resentments*.’—Would not one be apt to believe this Scribler had a Power of Attorney from all the good People of *England* to speak for them, act for them, nay, bully and threaten for them?—Who are *exasperated*? not the People, if they may be judg’d of, as in Reason they ought, by their Representatives in Parliament. These true and only Attorneys of the People are calm in their Debates, uniform in their Actions, and in no wise, in their legislative Capacity, appear to be *exasperated*: Therefore, this first Part of his Assertion must be admitted to be without the least Foundation, unless, because a starv’d Scribler, or discontented *Patriot* proclaims the People *exasperated* for the Purpose of Confusion, this Writer may be credited against the Authority of one’s own Reason, which proves, that the Nation are not *exasperated* because their Representatives are not so, except a few disappointed *Broad Bottomers*.

‘ The Ministers *dare* exasperate the People farther ‘ in Defiance of their *Complaints* and *Resentments*.’—How are we to judge of the People’s *Complaints*? Not from the Forgeries of weekly and daily Two-penny Sribblers, I hope, nor from the Harangues of Coffee-house Politicians. Through such Canals Slander and Obloquy have flow’d abundantly in all Reigns
and

and Ages. Envy and Discontent are so blended with the Nature of us Islanders of Freedom, that public Content wou'd be as great a Wonder as bearing Superiority with Patience. If vulgar Errors, and popular Complaints are to be the Standard by which national Content and Happiness are to be tried, this Nation has never been happy, never will, nor never can. If a Man but reflect back on his own Time, won't he recollect that there were Complaints in every Reign and every Administration? Let him extend his Reflexion, and recur to History for what pass'd in the Times preceding his, shan't he find Complaint, Envy and Discontent as rife and general? The Multitude is a Monster with many Minds and Affections, is guided by no Certainty, often imposed upon and led by the Cunning of one or a few Heads, tho' it abounds in Heads of its own, but they are for the most Part empty Seuls, veering with every artful Gale, and susceptible of every Impression tending to feed a sickly Fancy, Jealousy and Discontent. From so incoherent a Creature what can be expected but Murmur and Complaint?

Therefore, to judge of the Contest or Discontent of a Nation so circumstanc'd and constitution'd as ours, with any Certainty or Propriety, Recourse must be had to the incorporated Bodies of the Kingdom, but more especially to the Representatives of the People. Do the first shew a Dislike of public Measures? do they shew Discontent by their Addresses to the Throne? Are such Addresses general? and do they complain of Hardships? do the latter disagree with the Court? do they disapprove Measures? do they address frequently for Redress of Grievances? In fine, do the Parliament and the Incorporated, or Bodies politic of the Nation complain, one may conclude there is Cause for Complaint? but until such Tests of public Discontent, arising from Male-administration, are visibly seen, he must have as bad a Heart as
this

this incendiary *Journalist*, and a very weak Head, who would attempt misleading others, or be misled himself in relation to Discontent and Complaint.

But nothing of this kind appearing, the *Disappointed* have Recourse to another Subterfuge, which is to publish, that most of the Corporations are under Court Influence, and the Representatives of the People are no honefter than they should be. The first is morally impracticable: The incorporated Bodies of the Nation are absolutely, to speak in general, out of the Reach of Court or Ministerial Influence; therefore, wou'd it be concluding most egregiously wrong for a Man to say, *Public Discontent is not the less certain, because the incorporated Bodies don't complain; for they are all influenced by the Court.* Every Man of Sense must see the Absurdity of such an untenable Conclusion. Sure no Man will say, that the greatest and richest incorporated Body in the Nation, perhaps in the World, is under Court Influence; and yet we have not seen that they have address'd the Throne for redress of Grievances, or complain'd of the wrong Measures of the Cabinet. We have, indeed, seen a late *Address* from them, wherein it was thought proper to omit or forget inserting what was most *natural, seasonable* and *dutiful*: But these are Mistakes to which human Frailty is liable. They are the Effects of a sickly, peevish Habit of Body of some few of the Leaders; or, more likely, the Effects of the deep Impression of Sedition and Disaffection, which such treasonable Journals as this I am considering, are apt to make in weak, froward, wavering, envious, disappointed Minds.

There certainly is no Proof of public *Complaint* from the Incorporations of the Kingdom; and it happens unluckily for our seditious Declaimers, that the two Houses of Parliament are steady in their Zeal for the present Establishment, approve the Measures not only of this but the late Reign, and pay not

that Regard and Deference, which may be expected, to the Advices or Threats of the accomplish'd Statesmen in the Opposition; but to remedy so great an Evil, since they can't persuade the Representatives of the People to distress the Government, differ with the Court, disapprove of public Measures, or Complain, they move Heaven and Earth to inflame the People against their Representatives.

In this View they have recourse to two Expedients equally absurd and unpopular. By the first, these new-fangled Politicians are so far from paying Court to, or soothing those whom they would delude from their Duty and Interest, they vilify and abuse them in the most atrocious Manner, and wound them in the tenderest Parts. Can the Electors of this Kingdom take it as a Compliment to be told they have chosen Knaves, Men whose Persons and Principles they disliked, because they found a trifling, temporary Advantage in giving their Suffrages against their Conscience and Opinion? How gross the Complement; how injurious to the Honour and Probity of the worthiest and honestest Set of People in this, or any other Kingdom in the World! But why shall the Electors of *Great Britain* be abused, because those they have chosen are not mean and weak enough to co-operate with these shameless Revilers in carrying on the Work of Opposition and mercenary Views of such of the *Broad-Bottoms*, as are devour'd with Spleen and Ambition? But such is the Incongruity of modern Patriotism.

This Expedient failing our Declaimers, or rather retorting Scorn and Infamy back upon themselves, they fly to a Second. Since they can't persuade the People that the Electors were bribed to chuse Men of corrupt and infamous Characters, they endeavour to persuade them, that the Representatives are become, since the Election, as corrupt and mercenary, as they before described the Electors to have been.

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The Reason they found this Charge upon, is no other than what has been assign'd in every Reign since Parliaments were what they now are, and what will be offer'd, by the envious and ambitious, to the End of Time. It is singly this, that some of those who were thought worthy by the People to represent them, and take Charge of their Welfare in Parliament, are likewise thought worthy by the Prince, the common Parent, to be trusted with some Share of the Civil Government, to which some Profit or Emolument may be annex'd.

How infamous the Suggestion! How base the Maxim! how inconclusive and wrong the Conclusion! Is our Constitution so fram'd, that the Interest of the Prince and People is incompatible; or, the Service of both inconsistent? Is the Prince on the Throne so unreasonable, ambitious, or arbitrary, that obeying his Commands, and guarding against the Liberties of the Subject are repugnant? Or should this ever be the Case, which would be monstrous, even wicked to suppose, what can induce, these Inflamers of the Publick, to imagine that Men of Honour would sacrifice the Freedom of those they represent to poor transitory Advantages for themselves? Why suppose they would entail Misery and Slavery on their Country, themselves, their Posterity, to gratify the Ambition of any Prince, or acquire the Smiles and Favour of any sycophant Minister, who shou'd attempt executing any such enslaving Scheme? And why shou'd it be imagin'd, that a Majority of the richest, wisest, and most esteem'd Peers and Commons in the Nation, would be the only Part of the Legislature that should sacrifice their own Honour and Interest, the Interest and Liberty of the whole Nation, to mean, despicable Views, as all Views that center in Corruption are? And what Degree of Corruption must it be, that can warp such a Body as the Major-

rity in both Houses, from their Honour, their Interest, and their Duty?

If Corruption could be carried such Lengths, it must be by Fascination, it being indubitable, that there is not Strength or Power enough in the Crown to corrupt so large and wealthy a Number of Men of the best Sense and Fortunes in the Nation. All the Influence of the Crown, in Consequence of the Power to bestow Places and Titles would fall short; even the whole *Civil List* Revenue, could it be spar'd to corrupt for the Purpose of Slavery, would avail nothing with the *Majority* aspers'd by modern *Incendiarists*, who judge of others by the Experience of the Dictates of their own base Hearts.

On such a Supposition, as 'tis natural for Foreigners to entertain of our *Corruption*, from the false and scandalous Suggestions of these Scribblers, to the Dishonour of the Electors and Elected of this Nation, I wonder not at the Charge of a late foreign Writer, who personates a Foreigner at least, brought against us on the Subject of Corruption. This Author, who, I am very sorry for't, paints us more truly, tho' more deform'd than ever was known before, proves this Country to be no Money Province to *Hanover*, from our own Arguments; that is, from the Arguments of those amongst us who charge *Corruption* on the Legislature, yet maintain that *England* is a Money Province to the Electorate.

* ' *England* is a rich and opulent Country; but
 ' how does *Hanover* benefit by her Opulency? If our
 ' common Sovereign have a large Revenue in *Eng-*
 ' *land*, do not the *English* alone participate of it? Do
 ' not the *Writings* of their own *Libellers* prove, that the
 ' *Civil List* is insufficient to feed their own *Corruption*?
 ' And don't they say, that the late Minister em-
 ' ploy'd all that could be spar'd from the Support of
 ' the Grandeur of the Crown, to the Purposes of
 ' domestic

‘ domestic Corruption? If this be true, ’tis plain, n
 ‘ part of the *Civil List* Revenue could be spar’d, so
 ‘ as to be transported to us. If then, as we are de-
 ‘ barr’d all Benefit from Employments by the Act
 ‘ of Settlement, we can have no *English* Money, un-
 ‘ less it be out of that Revenue, and that this Fund
 ‘ is scarce sufficient to satisfy *English* Corruption, ac-
 ‘ cording to these Libellers themselves; if this be the
 ‘ Case, I say, our Country is necessarily acquitted of
 ‘ being richer by the Accession, and *England be-
 ‘ ing a Money-Province to Hanover.*——This Argu-
 ‘ ment, surely, is conclusive against those who in-
 ‘ veigh’d against the late Minister, and who vilify no
 ‘ less the present Great Man at the Helm, on the
 ‘ Score of Corruption. ’——I may have occasion
 to quote this plain blunt *Hanoverian* before I con-
 clude; but, for the present, the Reader will see how
 one of these *Incendiaries*, who attempts answering
 him, makes good the Charge of Corruption on the
Legislature, or destroys the Foreigner’s Conclusions.

* ‘ These are his mighty Reasons, which we shall
 ‘ examine; but suppose they had been conclusive, so
 ‘ far as they go, would that argue an Impropriety in
 ‘ those Writers that had coined the Phrase; if it can
 ‘ be proved, that all our Expences since the Acces-
 ‘ sion, in Armaments at Home, foreign Subsidies,
 ‘ and foreign Troops, Wars on the Continent, and
 ‘ on Account of Guaranties, may be placed solely to
 ‘ the Account of the Electorate, may it not be said
 ‘ with the utmost Propriety, *that England is a Mo-
 ‘ ney-Province to Hanover?* tho’ no Part of the *Civil
 ‘ List* Revenue can be spared from *English Corrup-
 ‘ tion, &c.* ’——This Paragraph begs the Question
 all the Way, and proves nothing, therefore neither
 requires nor deserves a serious Answer; nor is it any
 at all to the *Hanoverian’s* Argument. *If this be true,
 that be true, and the other false,* just as the Child will
 have

have it, he can't fail of being deem'd a Hero amongst his Playfellows; but Men of Sense expect other Sort of Treatment, and are to be convinc'd only by the Force of Truth, at least of Probability.—But let us hear this *Champion* for the *English Nation*; that is, for the *disaffected* of the Nation, where he would seem to intend a direct Answer.*

* 'I am willing to agree with the Baron, that 'Corruption is grown to a monstrous Size since the 'Accession (by the Way, the Baron, or *Hanoverian*, says not a Word of the Growth of Corruption since the Accession; but 'tis the Practice of these 'Quixots to raise Windmills for the sake of combating them) and am not altogether clear, but that 'his late Majesty had, according to this *Hanoverian's* 'Authority, relied on it as the Staff of his Peace and 'Safety, but at the same Time, our Author does not 'know, or forgets, that the Crown has various Methods in her Power of *corrupting*, without employing a Shilling of the *Civil List* Revenue. Therefore, supposing the late Minister as guilty of *Corruption* as is alledged, it concludes, indeed, that 'we are the most venal People under the Sun, but 'does not conclude, that no Part of the *Civil List* 'Revenue, was sent, or could be spar'd to be sent to 'Hanover.'——But I beg this shrewd Disputant's Pardon, the Argument is certainly conclusive upon his own Hypothesis. For supposing the *Hanoverian* should be ignorant of the Influence of the Crown, by the various Methods in her Power to corrupt, without employing a Shilling of the *Civil List* Revenue, we on this Side of the Sea know full well that the Crown can't, nor never will be able to bribe a Majority of both Houses of Parliament out of their Honesty and Tenderness to the Welfare of their Country, and regard for Posterity, by the sole Influence of *Places* and *Titles*, which are all those various Methods mention'd.

* *The English Nation Vindicated*, &c. p. 63.

tion'd. I deny, as all Men of Sense and Candour will and mult, that, even with the Aid of the intire *Civil List Revenue*, could it be spar'd for the Purposes of *Corruption*, the Crown would find it impracticable to corrupt to bad Purposes a Majority in both Houses of Parliament; but was it practicable, and was it practised, it would prove incontestibly the *Baron's* Position against the *Vindicator of the English Nation*, viz. that as no Money can be spar'd from the *Civil List* to be sent to *Hanover*; and that none can be sent thither, by the Court, but out of that Fund, the Electorate can have no Money from *England*, and consequently is *no Money-Province to Hanover*.

We come now to examine the Articles of Impeachment, exhibited against his Majesty and his Ministers, by the Author of the seditious Journal before-mention'd, and his Associates and Patrons: We will take his Articles separately, in this Place, to refute them with the more Perspicuity, tho' we inserted them intire before.

Divided and weakened at Home, they have dar'd to embroil us, unally'd and unassisted, Abroad.—If this dictatorial Scribe supposes us a *divided* Nation from the Murmurs and Discontent, fomented by such envious, disappointed, satyrical Scriblers and oratorial Declaimers as himself, his Epithet, *divided*, is not improper: But if the Union of a Nation, such as this, may be said with Propriety to consist in Unanimity between the represented and Representatives, and among these latter in their Legislative Capacity, never was the Nation more united; and never was the Epithet *divided* more impertinently and erroneously applied. If then there be Harmony and Union between the Majority of the Electors and the elected, and between those amongst themselves, and in Conjunction with the two other Branches of the Legislature, the Division complain'd of is no Objection to the present Conduct of our Ministers, with regard to
the

the *Continent*, if the Measure in itself be justifiable. But before we go into this Discussion, let us examine if the Author's Epithet, *weakened*, be not as ill-founded as the first.

Another late *Sedition-Monger*, with as little Truth but more Solemnity, makes the same Objection to our interfering in the present Broils on the *Continent*. An Answer to one, is an Answer to both him and the *Journalist*. Much Pains he has taken to mislead his Countrymen, and in Particular to persuade them, that because they are *poorer and weaker* than ever, they must be ruin'd if they meddle in Wars on the *Continent* in Support of the Ballance of Power. His Arguments to prove our *Poverty and Weakness* are very particular.—* *One infallible Sign of our Poverty, is, according to this magisterial Writer, that a Handful of Jews, who never employ'd five Hands at Home, in any other Way than administering to our Luxury, and who never exported any Thing Abroad, except perhaps our Coin, are able to lend the Public Millions.*—And, as if his Argument was absolutely conclusive, he goes on with an Air of Triumph.—*If this is not a Demonstration that Industry and Trade are sinking, and that nothing can save us, but a timely Interposition and public Spirit* (such as modern Patriots are actuated withall) *I think Scepticism ought to take Place of Reason, &c.*

I should be sorry to tax this important Writer with Disingenuity, but let him take his Choice, to be call'd *ignorant*, or *disingenuous*. One of the two he certainly is, and perhaps both.—First, it is not true, *that a few Jews have lent Millions, on half a Million, unless he means at different Times, which he cannot mean, if he has any determinate Meaning, except that of inflaming and misleading the Public.* Secondly, 'tis not true, *that Jews employ no Hands, and export nothing but our Coin*; it being well known that some of the most eminent Exporters of our Manufactures, and produce of our Colonies, to all Parts, but particularly to *Jamaica, Portugal, Spain*, when that Trade was open; to *Italy, Germany and Holland*, are of that Nation. And it is notorious, that none of our Adventurers Import so few Articles of Luxury as the *Jews*. We never hear of them as Importers of *Wine, French Brandy, Cambricks, Lawns, Flanders Lace*, or other Articles equally destructive. But it is true, they export Bullion, to which they have a double Right, by Law, and by being greater Importers of Bullion, coin'd and otherwise, than any other Set of Merchants in the Nation. But, says the Author, *they export our Coin.*—I don't believe it, because there is more to be got by exporting Bullion and foreign Coin. But I confess myself an Advocate for the free Exportation of Coin from all Countries, looking upon it no otherwise than as a Merchandise, which will, in Spite of all Prohibitions, find its Way where 'tis of most Value.

But supposing a Handful of our *Jews* lent Millions to the Government, it is undoubtedly an Indication of the Stability of the

the Government, when the deepest and most discerning People in the World trust it with so vast a Capital; and why such great Sums so lent, should be a Sign of *Poverty*, and *Demonstration that Trade and Industry are sinking*, is past my Comprehension, and I believe, that of every Man of Sense in the Nation, except the envious and disappointed. It would carry me a far greater Length than I have room for at present, did I trace this intricate Subject through all its various Branches and Windings, but I think it is an Evidence beyond any reasonable Objection, that our *Trade and Industry are not sinking*, because public Credit was never more steady and less variable, and Interest of Money never lower, or Money better secured or plentier. Men of Fancy and Prejudice, may play upon Things and Words, but there are none of *Euclid's* Problems clearer, than that without a beneficial *foreign Trade*, and the certain Consequence, an *increase of national Wealth*, no Art, no Contrivance in Nature, could support public Credit, or reduce Interest as we see it.

But besides these Proofs, conclusive to every Man of Discernment, there are many others, perhaps more visible to the common Run of Readers. The principal Article of our Trade and Industry being the *Woollen-Manufacture*, I hope it will be allow'd, that neither are sinking, if this inestimable Branch of our Industry be more flourishing than ever. The Call for our *Woollen-Manufactures*, is at this Time so general and urgent, that we can't supply fast enough. This being a Fact not to be disputed, I hope it will be admitted as a Proof of my Assertion; *viz.* that our Trade and Industry are not sinking, any otherwise than from the necessary Impediments attending our War with *Spain*.—To this I know it will be objected, that the present extraordinary Demand, arises from the small Quantity made, occasion'd by the Fewness of Hands or Manufacturers employ'd. This might be an Objection, if it had not been refuted by the Price of *Wool*, which happens to be higher than has been known for above *twenty Years past*. The great advanc'd Price of *Wool* is a certain Sign of the great Increase of the Demand of Manufactures, and consequently, *that we are not a sinking Nation*, and therefore not within the Description of the Libellers against the Court.

This * Author, who affects universal Knowledge, brings another Proof of our *sinking Trade*, as ill-founded as the last. † 'The Weight of our Taxes adds such an artificial Weight to the intrinsic Value of our Manufactures, as puts it in the Power of some of our Neighbours, particularly the *Dutch* and *French* to under-sell us, &c.'—It is admitted our Taxes are heavy, but yet not so great a Weight upon Manufactures as in *Holland*, where notwithstanding they work cheaper than we do; but not cheaper than we could, if our Artificers would be contented to live as parcimoniously as the *Dutch*. Therefore the Dearness of our Manufactures arises from our *Luxury*, which no Ministry

* *German Politics*, &c. p. 96.

† Ibid.

Ministry are accountable for, and not from our Taxes; and the Decrease of the Demand from Abroad, so much complain'd since the Accession, does not arise so much from the advanced Price of our *Woollen Goods* at Home, as from an Increase of *Industry* in the other Nations of *Europe*, since the last General Peace, who were at Leisure, and enabled to cloath themselves without being beholding to us. The *Dutch* more than we, feel the Effects of the spreading Industry of other Nations since the Treaty of *Utrecht*, which, tho' a Certainty not to be controverted, this very knowing Author, seems to be quite ignorant of.—Another Proof that we are not *weaken'd*, is, that in every Article which constitutes *National Wealth*, there is an Increase and Improvement: In shipping Number of Seamen, Buildings, Improvement of Lands, Plate, Furniture, Jewels, Number of Artificers and Adventures, and Number of Cattle of all Kinds. After so many and plain Evidences of the National Wealth, could it be thought that any Writers could be vain enough to hope to be able to impose so far on the Understanding of Mankind, as to persuade them, that because the Nation is *divided, poor and weak, the interposing in the present Broils of the Continent, tho' in Support of the Ballance of Power, is a wrong Measure?*

I have thus endeavour'd to solve the Objections of the present clamorous Opposition, in relation to our *Divisions, Weakness and Poverty*, and shall endeavour to shew next, *that we are not unal-ly'd, or unassisted in the Part we take in the Affairs of the Continent*: But previous to this, it may be necessary to disprove another Assertion equally false and daring, *viz. that we have not the least visible Concern in the present Disputes on the Continent.*—The * *Journal* I quote from, gives no Reason but the *ratio ultima* of Incendiaries, for an Assertion exploded ever since the Reformation, but particularly since the Revolution. But his † Fellow Labourer takes a new Way to shew, that we put ourselves to a very unnecessary Expence, because the *Germanic Body*, which he makes to be twice as strong as *France*, is alone able, and would be willing to keep that aspiring Crown within safe Bounds, provided they have nothing to apprehend from the Power of the House of *Austria*. The whole Drift of his 150 Pages, being to support this Position, together with the Novelty of it, having fix'd the Attention of many well-meaning, but unwary Readers, we will bestow a few Observations upon it.

I need not point out, what is so very obvious in almost every Page of this voluminous Work, that the Author's View is to persuade his Readers, that the Declension of the Power of the House of *Austria*, is the Means to support the Ballance of Power. He must mean this or nothing, when he labours so often and arduously to shew, that all the present Power and Influence of *France* are owing to the superior Power of that House in the Empire. But in Spight of all his Fallacies and Address, an *Englishman*, who really wishes an *Equality of Power on the Continent*,

* *Old England.*† *German Politics.*

ment, on a Supposition that the *Freedom* and *Commerce* of his Country are in Danger without it ; I say, such a one, can never be persuaded but that the Power of the House of *Austria* is the surest and only safe Let to the Ambition of the House of *Bourbon*.

The aforesaid Author, to make a Parade of his extensive Knowledge, or, rather to delude, gives a Detail of the Force of the Empire, which he makes to amount to 794,000 Men, twice a greater Number, he says, than *France* can maintain. He had a nearer Way to compute the Force of both ; which was by the Number of Souls in each, and their Riches, or Means to support a long War. By this Method, by which only a probable Conjecture may be made, I doubt not it will appear, that the House of *Bourbon* is superior in Men and Wealth to the Empire ; and that consequently, the *Germanic Body* alone are not able to withstand the Power of that ambitious House, or to maintain the Ballance of Power.

There is no Possibility of arriving at Certainty in these Sort of Computations, the best of them being conjectural ; but if it be true, or near the Truth, as the most accurate Writers agree, that the Number of Souls in the *French* Monarchy, are at least 23 Millions, and that in the *Spanish* and *Sicilian* Monarchies, at least 10, I think it won't be disputed, that the Power of the *Germanic Body*, as to Numbers, is inferior to that of the House of *Bourbon* : And, if the natural Wealth of *Spain*, and the natural and artificial Wealth of *France* be attentively consider'd, I think it must be as little doubted, that, as to the Means of supporting and prolonging a War, the collective Body of the Empire, cannot pretend to cope with the House of *Bourbon*.

Upon this Supposition then, even if the *Germanic Body* was united, the House of *Bourbon* must necessarily execute, at long Run, any Schemes she may form upon the Liberties of *Germany*, unless the *maritime Powers* confederate against her, whenever she attempts openly and hostilely to extend her Power and Influence, as in the present Conjecture. But if the House of *Bourbon*, or *France*, which is the same, may be supposed an over Match for the Empire, tho' united, how may she not be able to prescribe, when *disunited*, which, morally speaking, must always be the Case ? And this is an additional Advantage *France* has, and always will have over the Empire. Her Force is united and collected, but that of *Germany* never can.

The Disparity of the Power of the *Germanic Body*, in Numbers and Riches, compar'd with that of the House of *Bourbon* ; and above all, the *Disunion* of that Body, require absolutely that the *maritime Powers*, at all Times, should fall with their Weight into the *German Scale*, against *France*, whenever she attempts embroiling *Germany* in Particular, and *Europe* in General. King *William* was sensible of the Necessity of adopting this *Maxim* ; and the not adopting it, was the primary Cause of his Predecessor's Misfortunes : Nor is it at all unnatural to sup-

pose, that this, and other Incendiaries, explode this Maxim at this Time, the better to reduce his present Majesty to the unhappy Circumstances of that mistaken Prince, who had never been oblig'd to quit his Country, if he had prudently enter'd into the Confederacy against *France*, which was forming just before the *Revolution*.

It is not supposed, that *France* has any Views of Conquest beyond the *Rhine*; therefore are the Members of the Empire in no Pain about her Acquisitions elsewhere? This will always be a Reason, if an Union were possible, that the *Germanic Body* will never unite to oppose the House of *Bourbon* in her Views on *Italy* and the *Netherlands*, where it becomes the maritime Powers more indispensably to prevent her Conquests. Is *Italy* once in the Power of *France*, we may bid adieu to our Trade, not only to *Italy*, but *Turkey* and the Coast of *Africa*; and should the *Austrian Netherlands* be in French Hands, there would be an End, not only of our Trade to these Provinces, but too surely of our Liberties also.

These being Points too self evident for an *Englishman* to doubt, it follows, that our present Conduct with regard to the Continent, is judicious and meritorious. The House of *Austria*, without our Interposition, would be reduced to the lowest Ebb; and when once so, nothing could prevent *Spain* from executing her Schemes in *Italy*, nor *France* from the Execution of her premeditated Designs on the *Netherlands*. There is no denying this, unless it can be proved, that the *Germanic Body*, if free from Dread of the Power of the House of *Austria*, would unite to preserve these remote Provinces, to which they are no Ways obliged. But such Proof being impossible, it is notorious, that *Italy* and the *Netherlands* would soon own *Bourbon* Masters, unless the House of *Austria* had been seasonably and vigorously supported of late by this Nation.

This leads me back to consider the Rectitude of the Maxim, which all the modern Incendiaries endeavour to explode, viz. 'that it is always the Interest of this Nation to confederate against *France*, and to exert her Strength in reducing the exorbitant Power of that ambitious Crown, and most dangerous of all our Rivals and Neighbours.' On this Supposition, the Criterion of our Conduct should be unvariably to resist and reduce that Crown. The Observation of this prudential Maxim, must necessarily be attended with great Perplexity and Expence; 'tis impossible it should be otherwise: But how dreadful must the Inobservation of it be to those who justly center the Welfare of these Nations in the Ballance of Power?

Supposing the *Germanic Body*, able to maintain its Liberties and Territories against the Power of *France*, of what Consequence would the Freedom of *Germany* be to us, if by the Conquest of *Italy* and the *Netherlands*, our Commerce and Liberties would lie at the Mercy of that ambitious Neighbour? The *German* Powers, in their collective Capacity, always move slowly,
even

even when the common Enemy of Christianity attack their Contry, how then can it be supposed they would move allertly, as would be necessary to oppose *France*; or rather, how can it be imagined, they would join or move at all, so far as *Italy* and the *Netherlands*, to oppose the Views of a Crown, that can never fail of corrupting, or gaining upon the Weakness of some of the Members of a Body, composed of Individuals with so different Views and Interests?

From Considerations arising naturally from this Subject, it is obvious to every Man of ever so moderate Understanding, that there is no Reliance on the *Germanic Body*, for the Security of the Ballance of Power in General, or the Safety of the Trade and Freedom of the *maritime Powers* in Particular. That Body, if *united*, is no Match for the House of *Bourbon*; but *disunited*, as it ever will be, *France* must always influence its Councils to the Destruction of the Ballance of Power, unless some considerable Power remain intire and uninfluenc'd besides the *Maritime*. The House of *Austria* is this Power. There is no other whose Situation and Power can answer the Purpose. That House has Territories in *Italy*, and an open Communication from its Hereditary Dominions. It has Possession of the *Netherlands*, in the Preservation of which, it is essentially interested: And by its Vicinity to, and Possessions on the upper *Rhine*, it is always at Hand to fall upon *France* in *Alsace*, with more numerous Armies than any other Power in *Germany*.

Therefore, to view this House in all Respects, to examine this Subject in all Lights, there is no Power, except that of *Austria*, capable of stemming the Torrent of *Gallic* Power and Ambition, in Conjunction with the *maritime Powers*. This *Postulat* being granted, and I venture to say it cannot be deny'd, it follows, that every Means for supporting that House, is a right Measure in the *maritime Powers*; and consequently, that the late and present Conduct of our Court, with regard to that House, is not only justifiable, but necessary and meritorious.

Yet notwithstanding the Notoriety of the Rectitude of our Conduct in supporting that House, the only Ally of Consequence the *maritime Powers* can possibly have recourse to in Times of Danger, the domestic Enviars of our Happiness seek every Means, have recourse to every Opportunity and Expedient, to inflame the Public against the Court, for pursuing the only Measure that can secure our Liberties and Commerce. Among others, a fresh * *Incendiary* appears, who wasts much of his Gall to shew, that our present Allies, the Queen of *Hungary*, and King of *Sardinia*, are in so flourishing a Condition, as to stand in no need of our Assistance, and consequently, that we ought to allow them no Subsidy. This Author, who presumes to censure the very best Treaty that could possibly be enter'd into at this Conjunction, like the rest of his seditious Fraternity, is as harden'd an Atheist in Politics, as others were in Religion.

The

* *Free Thoughts on the Treaty of Worms, &c.*

The Sceptics in Religion refuse their Assent to the plainest Evidence of a Deity, nay, to the Conviction of their own Conscience; so do our modern Sceptics deny the Truth of the most conclusive Arguments, and act in direct Contradiction to their own State of Things, and their own Interest too. Such is the Force of Pique and Resentment, such the Power of Party and Ambition! As the Libertines in Religion refuse owning a Deity, by whose Mercy and Bounty they are enabled to pronounce their Refusal, so the modern Profligates in Politics seem to refuse Allegiance to a Prince, by whose Lenity they enjoy the Freedom they so ungratefully employ to asperse and injure him!—What else but refusing Allegiance, or endeavouring to wean the Subjects from their Allegiance to the mildest King that ever reign'd, could the Insertion of the following *Command* from the Parliament, to *Edw. II.* to resign his Crown, mean? That seditious Writer's Intention is too self-evident to need a Comment.

† ' Judge *Trussel*, Attorney for the People, spoke as follows to *Edward II.* when he went to force the *Regalia* from him—
' I *William Trussel*, Attorney for the Parliament and whole
' *English* Nation, do declare to you in their Name, and by their
' Authority, that I revoke and retract all the Homage made to
' you; and from this Moment I deprive you of the Sovereign
' Power, and protest, I will never after obey you as my King.'

After so barefaced, impudent, I may say treasonable an Attack upon Majesty, can we admire that a *Foreigner* should draw the following Portraiture of us? * But why should we expect a dutiful Deference for our Prince, from a People famed, not only for disturbing the Quiet, and resisting their Kings, but for dethroning, and even cutting off their sacred Heads: Witness their own Annals.—And in Regard to their injurious Treatment of their Sovereigns, there is one thing observable of them, which is not known of any other Nation on Earth; and that is, *That they take Pride and Glory in the Perjury and eminent Wickedness of their Ancestors.*—How applicable are these *last Words* to the incendiary Writers of our Times, and particularly to the insolent *Journalist*, who, by the Insertion of a Transaction, which does so great Dishonour to our Nation, and for that Reason ought never to be mention'd, has drawn me from my Subject on these Quotations.

I have endeavoured to prove, in Opposition to the Scriblers against the Government, *that we are essentially concern'd in Interest to support the Queen of Hungary, as the only Counterpoize, in Conjunction with Holland, against the Power of France; and that it is no less our Interest to lay bold of all favourable Opportunities for resisting and reducing that Power.*—I doubt not the unprejudiced Reader will be convinced, because tho' I might not have been happy enough to convey my Thoughts to him as clearly and forcibly as I ought, yet the main *Truth*, and Force of the Positions are so very evident, that he can scarce mistake them,

them, notwithstanding the great Art and Industry used, by modern Sycophants, to cloud the Subject and mislead the Unwary.

But say the *discontented*, and particularly the aforesaid *gan-green'd Journalist*; 'The Measures now pursued are not only the most unpopular, but carried on by the most *unpopular* Means, &c.'—As I have already shewn that our present Conduct with Regard to *France* and our *Allies* is right, I need not take Pains to prove, that it is false to say, *That our Measures are the most unpopular*, because no Measure, right in itself, can, at least ought to be unpopular: But the *Means* of carrying on this Measure, is what I will endeavour to shew ought not, nor would be *unpopular*, unless it had been misrepresented with uncommon Art and Virulency.

This *Means*, thus represented as the most unpopular that cou'd be, is no other than the taking 16000 of the Troops of his Majesty's foreign Dominions into *British* Pay: But why is this *Means* become unpopular? not because it was unnecessary or improper, but because, in consequence of it, our natural *Jealousy* of *Foreigners* and of our *King*, furnished our Incendiaries with the Means of awaking that uncharitable *Vice* in the Breasts of the most unthinking, tho' good-natur'd Commonalty in the World. The Men of Sense in the *Opposition* laugh in their Sleeves to see the Success of their Scheme. They saw the Court had no other alternative; they must have hired the Troops of *Hanover* to support the Cause of general Interest and Liberty, or it must sink. There was no other Choice; and if there had, what should bewitch this Nation to wish that another had been made? The *Opponents* saw the Necessity and Propriety of the *Means*, but their Business being to distress, and render odious those they hate, they had recourse to our ungenerous national Propensity to *Prejudice* and *Jealousy* of *Foreigners*.—Well may it be said of us, *That we are a Nation that feed upon Whim and Chimera, and from whom any Absurdity may be expected*, when the Public can be alarm'd at a Measure that can't affect either their Liberties or Properties in no Light in Nature, and suffer themselves to be inflam'd, on so slight an Occasion, and imposed upon so grossly by the most insolent, seditious Incendiaries that ever wore the Mask of Patriotism.—If ever the following Character was applicable to any Nation; if ever the Cap fitted any People, surely this Instance shews but too evidently it was made for us? *Gens ratione furens, & mentem passa Chimæris.*

On this Supposition it will be vain for me to attempt reasoning my Countrymen into an Approbation of this *Means*, accounted the *most popular*, by a discontented Faction. According to the aforesaid Discription of them, all solid Argument, instead of bringing them into Temper and Reason, will but render them the more furious and extravagant. An unhappy Temper of Mind, which furnishes Fuel to the Enemies of the Government, and is a Stock upon which they graft all their Sedition and Disloyalty! What will the Nations of *Europe* think of us? what Opinion will our Enemies have of our Union and Concord? what

Notion will the World form of our Affection and Duty to our Prince, when they hear the Nation capable of being inflam'd, by a few scribbling Incendiaries, because his Majesty's Electoral Troops are prefer'd to other Foreigners in Support of the House of *Austria* and Ballance of Power?—I wish, for the Honour of the Nation, I could, in this Instance, draw a Veil over the Inconstancy, the Inconsistency and Extravagance of my Countrymen: But since I can neither hide their Faults, nor hope to mend them by Admonition, let me at least endeavour to do Justice to injured Majesty to atone for the Ingratitude of my deluded Fellow-Subjects.

In justifying our present Measures, I may hope to have justified his present Majesty; and I doubt not, that after the Perusal of the following Tracts, every Reader will acquit his late Majesty King *George I.* of having sacrificed the Interests of these Nations to aggrandize the Electorate. I confess this latter Charge against a Prince and Ministers that can't answer for themselves was what induced me to commence Author. I could not bear seeing the Conduct of the best of Kings traduc'd, nor his Memory insulted. To sully the Honour of that Prince is wounding that of the present: To reflect on the Memory of a Predecessor is an Attempt to vilify the Successor and all his Descendants: Therefore, to rescue the Memory of the first from the Rancour of the false and malicious, may not be less meritorious, perhaps not less serviceable to the Family in general, than justifying the Conduct and Measures of the latter. As the Royal Son treads pretty near in the Royal Sire's Steps; to rescue the Memory of *George I.* is rescuing the Honour of *George II.* from the Malice of the common Enemies of their Family.

The mighty Crime alledg'd to King *George I.* is, that he sacrific'd the Interests of these Nations, in involving us, in the Beginning of his Reign, first with *Sweden*, on Account of his Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*; and next with *Russia*, in consequence of a Design he had form'd of annexing *Mecklenburg* to the Electorate. These were Points that have been labour'd by the scribbling Incendiaries of the Party, but particularly by * two who appear'd last Season, and † one, more malicious than the rest, who made his Appearance lately. This latter produces a long Memorial of the Czar's Resident in 1719 in Proof of the late King's Views on *Mecklenburg*, which could no otherwise be refuted than by the Answers made to it when the Transaction was fresh in the Memory of all *Europe*. These Answers, by the late Earl of *Stanhope* and others, I subjoin to this Tract, as the best Proof of the Integrity of his late Majesty, and the clearest Vindication of his Conduct in regard to *Mecklenburg* and *Muscovy*. A late ** Author has indisputably vindicated that glorious Prince's Conduct in regard to the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and the subsequent War with *Sweden*.

* *The Case of the Hanover Troops, &c. Vind. of the Case, &c.*

† *The English Nation vindicated, &c.* ** *Popular Prejudice, &c.*

*His MAJESTY'S Answer, as KING of Great Britain,
to the Memorial presented by the Czar's Resident
the 14th of December. 1719.*

HIS Majesty's great Regard for the Czar having induced him to direct that the Resident *Wesselofski's* Memorial of the 14th of *December* last, should be examined and considered maturely; and the said Memorial being interwoven with some Facts that concern his Majesty as King, and with others that relate to him only as Elector, he has caused an Answer to be given upon the latter by his German Chancellerie; and as to the Remainder, he has commanded me to give the following Reply.

His Majesty has ever carefully applied himself to pursue the Maxims of his Predecessors, especially those which might tend to keep him in Peace and Friendship with the other Powers of *Europe*, and to cultivate Commerce with them for mutual Advantage.

He has particularly shewn a sincere Desire to live well with the Czar, though the Crown of *Great Britain* is under no formal Engagements with that Prince; and to his Advances in seeking his Friendship may be imputed that Resentment of the late King of *Sweden* against His Majesty, the Effects of which have been manifest on divers Occasions.

In order to establish a good Correspondence with the Czar upon a solid Foundation, His Majesty desired to make a Treaty of Commerce with him; and Prince *Kourakin* did indeed come over hither upon that Negotiation in the Beginning of the Year 1716. But then, instead of answering in a suitable manner those Advances His Majesty had made, many Difficulties were started too long to be enumerated here; as particularly, that the King's Subjects should not trade to *Casan* and *Astracan*, a Privilege that had been allowed them by his Czarish Majesty's Predecessors: But what chiefly rendered this Negotiation fruitless, was, that the Czar never would come into this Treaty of Commerce unless an Alliance were concluded at the same Time, which was to extend so far as inevitably to engage *Great Britain* in a Rupture with the Crown of *Sweden*, its antient Ally; whose Destruction is equally inconsistent with the Peace and the Ballance of *Europe*, and with the Support of the Protestant Religion; to which His Majesty, both in regard to Conscience, and to Reasons of State, is under so many Obligations to contribute with all his Power.

It appears from the 7th Article of the proposed Alliance, which is inserted below *, that it was required of His Majesty not only to guarantie to the Czar the many Provinces which he had conquered from *Sweden*, without a great Part whereof that Crown cannot possibly subsist, but to assist him with a *British* Fleet to act directly against the *Swedes*; and even that this Fleet should be under the Command of the Czar and his Admirals, which, with regard to *Great Britain*, was the most impracticable and the most odious thing in the World: So that it is evident His Majesty could not enter into any such Engagements, without rendering all Peace or Agreement with *Sweden* utterly impossible, since he must have guarantied to the Czar Provinces which that Crown can never give up; and besides, His Majesty would thereby have drawn upon himself the Powers concerned in the Preservation of *Sweden*, and those which are obliged to it by their Alliances and Guaranties; the Friendship of which Powers was moreover so necessary to the King, in order to bring about, in Concert with them, the great Schemes he had formed for the Tranquillity of *Europe*. Let any one judge, whether His Majesty, how desirous soever he might be to secure the Czar's Friendship, could purchase it at so dear a Rate.

It was for these Causes the Negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce in the Month of *February* 1716, miscarried, and not on account of the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, which did not happen till the Month of *October* following. Whatever Share the King might have in this last mentioned Affair, as Elector, he did not intermeddle

* Copy of the 7th Article of the Project of Alliance offered by Prince Kourakin in 1716, and which, in all the Negotiations that have been since set on foot, has always been proposed on the Czar's Part as a Condition sine qua non.

Article VII. HIS Britannick Majesty promises and obliges himself on his part, that in the Negotiation of Peace with the Crown of *Sweden*, he will, as a good Ally, assist his Czarish Majesty with all his Power, and with all his Credit; that so by Virtue of that Peace, the Crown of *Sweden* may yield and give up for ever to his Czarish Majesty and to his Successors, the Provinces which are now actually under the Dominion of the said Czarish Majesty; that is to say, *Ingria*, *Livonia*, *Esthonia*, and *Carelia*, with all their Dependences, the Town of *Wybourg* included. And if his Czarish Majesty or his Successors shall be attacked or disturbed in those Provinces and Places, His Britannick Majesty obliges himself and his Successors, to assist them at his and their own Expence, Two Months after the same shall be required, with Fifteen Ships of the Line, which shall serve where his Czarish Majesty shall desire, and the said Squadron shall act under the Orders of his Czarish Majesty and of his Admiral.

intermeddle in it as King. Sir *John Norris* made no Attempt either against the Czar's Fleet, or against his Land Forces; no Concert was framed for that Purpose; and the Meaning of the Writes of the Memorial is not to be understood, when he insinuates that Admiral *Norris* was just going to act in an hostile Manner against the Czar's Fleet then at *Copenhagen*. An Imputation of this Nature ought never to be advanced without sufficient Proof; and if the Czar entertained any such Suspicion, it can be founded on no Fact that ever came to the Knowledge of His Majesty or any of his Ministers: It ought rather to be believed, that this Affectation of insinuating such Jealousies in the Memorial, is on Purpose to divert the Reader's Attention from the Designs which the Czar's Conduct at that time gave just Grounds to suspect him of: For if it be true that he had any such Views, and that being in the most intimate Alliance with the King of *Denmark*, he yet had projected no less than to possess himself of the *Sound* and of *Copenhagen* (instead of a Descent upon *Schonen*, with which the World had been amused for several Months) it is natural that he should endeavour to put the Publick upon a wrong Scent, and to turn the Bias of their Thoughts by Recriminations that have no manner of Foundation. Now if the Czar really had such Intentions, it is possible he was kept from bringing them to Effect by a just Apprehension that His Majesty's Fleet might oppose them, which it would infallibly have done in such a Case: And might not the Czar's Resentment at the Disappointment of so vast a Project by the Fear of a *British* Fleet, have been the Cause of his being so much estranged from His Majesty ever since that time? For from thence may be dated the Commencement of that Animosity, which on so many Occasions he has shewn against His Majesty.

This appeared soon after; when, by the Letters that past between Count *Gyllenburg* and Baron *Gortz*, it was discovered that the Czar was incensed against His Majesty to such a Degree, that he thought in good earnest of a Reconciliation with the King of *Sweden*, of making a separate Peace with him, and of assisting the Pretender at the same time to possess himself of the Throne of *Great Britain*; and in Truth, whatever Assurances of the contrary were given in the Memorial of 1717, the Czar's Conduct ever since seems to have been entirely suited to such a Scheme. The Negotiations of one *J. —n*, and of Sir *Hugh Paterfon*, Brother-in-Law to the late Lord *Mar*, with the *Russian* Ministry, while the Czar was in *Holland*, are not unknown; no more than are the Intrigues of that Ministry, both with the late Duke of *Ormond* whilst he lay incognito at *Mittaw*, and with Sir *Harry Stirling* and the said *J. —n* at *Petersbourg*, nor the Correspondence which, by Means of the Person last named, was settled between the Czar and the Court of *Spain*.

It appeared publickly, that the Czar gave all manner of Protection and Encouragement to a great Number of his Majesty's Rebel Subjects. It is well known that the Conferences at *Aland*, which were set on Foot without His Majesty's Knowledge, had their Rise from an Interview with Baron Gortz at *Loo*, in *August* 1717. That Minister's Papers have discovered the Design of those Conferences, and that an Invasion of *Scotland* was immediately to follow the Conquest of *Norway*; so that it is not strange the Czar should take no Care to prevent the Loss of that Country, or to succour his Ally the King of *Denmark* in so pressing an Exigence: In short, it is sufficiently known, that the Czar caused repeated Proposals to be made to the Court of *Spain*, to bring them into an Offensive Alliance against His Majesty in favour of the Pretender.

THE King, not yet discouraged by such Proceedings, endeavoured by all kind of Means to gain the Czar's Friendship. He did for that Purpose send to him in *August* 1717, Admiral *Norris* and Mr. *Whitworth*, both known, and, as His Majesty thought, acceptable to him; but the whole was again set aside, by proposing on his part that Alliance in which it was known the King could never enter, and which was made the more impracticable by the Condition they continued to insert in it, that the *British* Squadron should be under the Command of the Czar's Admirals.

THOUGH, as Things stood, his Majesty had Reason to believe that the Memorial which was presented to him by the Resident in Summer 1718, making mention of the Czar's Inclination to live in Friendship with him, was no more than an Artifice to cover the Negotiations and Intrigues before-mentioned; yet, that nothing might be wanting on his part, he took Occasion from thence to send Mr. *Jefferyes* his Resident to *Petersbourg*, and even ordered Admiral *Norris* to go thither likewise; but the Admiral being sailed from the *Baltick* on his Return to *England* before Mr. *Jefferyes* arrived at *Copenhagen*, he proceeded on his Journey without him. He omitted nothing that might bring to Effect the good Disposition he had been assured he should find in the Czar, but those Assurances soon appeared to be a further Amusement; for instead of making any Proposals to him, he was asked, What he had to offer? And when he spoke of re-establishing antient Friendship, and of concluding a Treaty of Commerce, he was told, that an Alliance must first be thought of, and a Plan settled for the Operations of War against *Sweden*; which Proposal it was well known could never be admitted by a *British* Minister.

THE Designs concerted at *Aland* with Baron Gortz being at length entirely overthrown by the King of *Sweden's* Death, the Czar not finding in the Princes who succeeded him any Disposition to pursue such unjust and dangerous Schemes, resolved to compel

compel her to it by Force, and by such violent Extremities as are scarce to be paralleled. Being full of this Imagination, he was alarmed at the Fleet his Majesty was obliged to send yearly into the *Baltick* to protect the Trade of his Subjects: He demanded, in an imperious and threatening Manner, upon what Design this was done; and he wrote to Admiral *Norris* in such Language as the Crown of *Great Britain* has not been used to.

HOWEVER, the King made no other Return to all these Proceedings, but mild Applications and Offers of his Mediation by the Lord *Carteret* and Admiral *Norris*; whilst the Czar would not so much as receive their Letters on this Subject, on Pretence, that they had no Credentials to him; an Objection which none of the other Powers engaged in the War against *Sweden* had started, tho' their Case was exactly the same.

To avoid whatever might exasperate, nothing shall be said here of the ill Treatment of his Majesty's Subjects in the Czar's Dominions, of *British* Seamen forced to serve on board the *Russian* Fleet; of Artificers denied the Liberty of returning to their Country; of Merchants confined without Cause; and of Ships and Cargoes seized and confiscated without Law or Justice.

HIS Majesty still persists in the same Sentiments of Moderation towards the Czar, desiring to live in Friendship and good Correspondence with him, and to be able to incline him to restore Tranquillity in the North. With this View he again offers his Mediation, hoping the Czar will not be the only Prince in *Europe* that opposes so just and salutary a Design. It may be said that nothing can be more suitable to his Interest, since this is proposed to be attained by procuring a Peace that will secure to him a considerable Part of his Conquests. His Majesty hopes that so knowing a Prince as the Czar, will not only moderate his Pretensions for the Advancement of the Peace in general, but will likewise distinguish, that it is more becoming his Prudence to secure to himself by good Treaties, and by the Consent of other great Powers, such considerable Tracts of Land, the Cession of which it is hoped may be procured from the Crown of *Sweden*, than to expose the Fruits of all his happy Success to the Events of a War in which he will stand alone. *Sweden* neither ought nor can yield up *Revel* to him; but though the Czar should restore that Place, he would still remain possessed of other Ports, and of a vast Extent of Territory along the Coasts of the *Baltick* Sea.

THE King's Complaisance in being still willing to mediate a Treaty that should procure such Advantages to the Czar, is an undeniable Proof of his Majesty's Inclination to live well with him; and if any thing can seem blame-worthy in this Conduct, it is, in many People's Opinion, the carrying Complaisance too far. If the Czar, after such Offers, persists in his Refusal to restore

store *Revel*, he will only alarm thereby all the other Powers, and unite most of them in Opposition to himself.

THE King's sincere Desire to see a General Peace established, and his Earnestness to renew for that End his former Union with the Czar, induce his Majesty upon this Occasion to offer him friendly Advice, and to exhort him to give a serious Attention to it.

If unhappily, and contrary to all Expectation, these Advances and good Intentions of his Majesty should, through the Czar's Refusal, be ineffectual; and that the King, by virtue of his Engagements with *Sweden* (which he is resolved to stand by) should find himself obliged to enter upon Measures disagreeable to the Czar, he will satisfy himself with having omitted nothing on his Part that might prevent the grievous Consequences which may ensue. Done at *Whitehall* the 11th of *February*, 1719-20.

S T A N H O P E.

His MAJESTY's Answer, as ELECTOR, to the Memorial presented to the Czar's Resident, the 14th of December, 1719.

HIS Majesty has ordered Answer to be returned to the Memorial presented by the Resident *Wesselofski*, as far as that Memorial concerns him in the Quality of Elector, That he was very much surprized to see the Reproaches contained in it, because he has not deserved them from his Czarish Majesty, whose Friendship he has always cultivated very carefully, as well before as since his Accession to the Crown.

It is not his Majesty who has deviated from the Treaty of 1715; on the contrary it is his Czarish Majesty who has departed from it, seeing nothing could be more against it, than his coming to establish himself in the Empire with an Army, and to possess himself of Provinces contiguous to his Majesty's Dominions in *Germany*. It may be remembered, that his Majesty observing the *Russian* Troops in *Mecklenburg*, a Magazine formed at *Rostock* for their Subsistence, and the Country ruined by their Exactions, discharged towards his Czarish Majesty the Office of a Friend and an Ally, by causing to be represented to him the Prejudice he was doing himself by such a Proceeding, and the Danger he was in of drawing upon himself the Head and the Members of the Empire.

THOSE who consider the Rank which his Majesty holds, as well in the Empire as in the Circle, and the Interest he had in the Tranquillity of his Neighbourhood, will doubtless judge, that such Instances were not only founded in Justice and Equity, but likewise

likewise that his Majesty could not avoid making them, and that he was obliged to it by all manner of Reasons. Accordingly it was much wondered they did not produce any Effect, and that the Czar's Ministers should seek only to gain Time, and to amuse the World with illusory Promises of the March of their Master's Troops, without ever fixing a Term for that March. It even appeared plainly, that those Instances of the King, gave Rise to that Animosity of the Czar against his Majesty, which has since broke out on so many Occasions. One Effect of it was the Interview which the Czar and his Ministers had at *Loo* with Baron *Gretz*, who had been newly dismissed from his Confinement at *Arnheim*; seeing that Baron was then intrusted to bring about a separate Peace between the Czar and the King of *Sweden*. His Czarish Majesty did not only not communicate that Interview at all to the King, but when the Resident *Weber* spoke of it a little after to his Ministers at *Petersbourg*, they thought fit to deny it. And yet it was that Interview which gave Birth to the Congress at *Aland*, which was formed without his Majesty's Knowledge, insomuch that, when M. *Osterman* set out to go thither in the Month of *January* 1718, he denied the Matter with Oaths to the Resident *Weber*, and assured him he was going to *Moscow*, where his Czarish Majesty then was. The Czar would never admit his Majesty's Minister to the Conferences at *Aland*, nor impart to him what was treating there; nor will this be wonder'd at, if it be consider'd that his Czarish Majesty was framing Plans there, the Drift of which was no less than to unite his Forces with those of the King of *Sweden*, for carrying the War into his Majesty's Dominions in *Germany*, and for invading *Scotland* after the Conquest of *Norway*. It was the Interview at *Loo*, and several other suspicious Proceedings of the Czar, that induced his Majesty to send into *Sweden* the Counsellor *Schrader*, to endeavour to discover whether there was any Ground for the Rumours which were spread of a separate Peace ready to be concluded between his Czarish Majesty and *Sweden*. It is affirmed in the Memorial, that those secret Negotiations of his Majesty, determined the Czar to form the Congress at *Aland*; whereas it is publicly well known, that the Czar's two Plenipotentiaries set out from *Petersbourg* in the Middle of the Month of *January* 1718, and Counsellor *Schrader* did not begin his Journey till the Month of *March* the same Year. His Stay at *Lunden* in *Schonen* was but for three Weeks, and he did not see the King of *Sweden*, who was then at *Stromstat*. The Death of that King happening at the End of the Year 1718, his Czarish Majesty took thereupon a Resolution to make the utmost Efforts to oppress *Sweden*, and force it to accept the Conditions which he should please to prescribe. No Man is ignorant of the Ravages and Burnings which he caused to be made for gaining his Point.

He

He sent M. *Osterman* to *Stockholm*, instructed to propose exorbitant Terms: But if his Czarish Majesty did then employ both Force and Negotiation, it was only for procuring his own separate Peace. His Britannick Majesty's Interests were no Part of the Question; on the contrary, the Business in Hand was, after the Conclusion of the Czar's Peace with *Sweden*, to take Measures with that Crown for coming into the Empire with united Forces, and recovering for the *Swedes* what they had lost there.

In this Situation, or to speak more properly, in this Extremity, his Britannick Majesty thought it Time at last to look to himself, and hinder the Ruin of a Protestant Kingdom, in uniting with it by Alliances. But this was done without proceeding to any Hostilities against his Czarish Majesty. On the contrary, the King offered him his Mediation, which he had the more Right to do, because *Great Britain* was never engaged in the War of the North, and because this Mediation had been accepted by the Queen of *Sweden*.

It is manifest therefore, that if the King has prevented the Czar, by his Treaty with *Sweden*; he was authorized, not to say forced to do it, by the many Proceedings of that Prince, who had for so long a Time been treating of Peace, in Exclusion of his Majesty, in a publick Congress formed without his Consent, and who was on the Point of putting *Sweden* under the Yoke. His Majesty's *British* Ministers will take Care to set forth, in the Answer which they will deliver to the Resident, his Majesty's just Causes of Complaint, in the Quality of King of *Great Britain*.

In the mean Time, it depends wholly on the Czar to re-establish intirely Friendship and good Intelligence, and to let the Troubles of the North cease, by making Use of a Mediation, which has no other Aim than to put an End to them, and in their Room to settle Peace and Tranquillity. Done at St. *James's* the 21st of *January*, 1720.

LETTER from a Gentleman at London to a Friend in Holland, upon the Memorial presented to his Britannick Majesty, by the Resident of his Czarish Majesty, on the 14th of December 1719.

S I R,

I Received the Memorial of the Czar's Resident, which you sent me, and which is printed in your News-Papers in *Holland*. It seeming to me by your Letter, that this Memorial has made an Impression on some People's Minds, and it being indeed written with a great deal of Artifice, I thought, that besides the Answers deliver'd to the said Resident by his Britannick Majesty's Mini-

Ministers, (of which I do not doubt Copies have been sent to you) you would be glad to find in this Letter several Particulars, of which I am perfectly well informed the Discussion of which is of so great Length, that it could not well be brought into the Answers of his *Britannick* Majesty's Ministers.

If the Author of the Memorial lays with so much Affectation such Stress on the Care which he pretends his Czarish Majesty has taken to maintain a good Union with the King, I will make out to you, that his Majesty cannot be charged with having on his Side neglected any thing for strengthening that Union, and that he has been far from being the first to break it. It would be superfluous to relate here all that his Majesty did to gain and preserve the Czar's Friendship before his coming to the Crown of *Great Britain*: After his Accession, he found new Motives for cultivating this Friendship, being desirous to make Commerce between the two Nations flourish, and he redoubled his Cares for tying still faster the Bands of Union already established, which was further corroborated by a Treaty in the Year 1715. Yet from the Beginning of 1716, there was Reason to suspect the Czar of Views highly prejudicial to the Empire, on Occasion of his Engagements with the Duke of *Mecklenburg*, who had married one of his Nieces: For it plainly appeared, that his Czarish Majesty, in Concert with that Duke, had framed a Design to seize on *Wismar*, and to harbour his Ships in that Port. The Northern Allies had blocked up that Place; the Czar had then but three Regiments in *Mecklenburg*, and as they would not have been sufficient for an Enterprize of such Importance, he caused a very strong Body of Forces to advance with incredible Diligence, his Heart being set upon possessing himself of *Wismar*; but those Troops came too late, and found that Place in the Hands of the Allies, to whom it surrendered in April 1716. The Duke of *Mecklenburg* indeed, seeing the Place could hold out no longer, had caused the said three *Russian* Regiments to approach it, and endeavoured, by offering a great Sum of Money, to get that Place delivered into their Hands; but his Attempts failing, and the whole *Russian* Army arriving soon after in the Duke's Territories, it was then proposed to make a Descent on *Schonen*; and after having concerted that Project with his *Danish* Majesty, the Czar, at the Head of his Army, passed over in the Month of *July* to *Copenhagen*, from whence the Descent was to be made. All Things were ready for that Enterprize; the *Danish* and *Russian* Fleets had joined; the *British* Fleets had no Orders to do any thing against the Czar; the *Danish* Army was ready to embark; the necessary Transports and Stores were provided; and, considering the great Superiority by Sea and Land, there was good Ground to hope that the Success of this Enterprize, which was looked upon as almost infallible, would oblige the King of

Sweden to yield to a reasonable Peace ; when, all on a sudden, the Czar declared he would not run the Hazard of Landing, and his Ministers alledged such weak and frivolous Reasons, that it then appeared his Czarish Majesty had not come into *Zealand* with a Resolution to make that Descent, and even that he never had it in his Intention ; and indeed People afterwards became sensible in a manner that left no Room for Doubt, that the Czar had left his Dominions with quite another View than that of making a Landing in *Schonen*, that Project being nothing but a Pretence to cover Designs of a quite different Nature. The Czar, by his Conduct, gave just Grounds even to suspect that his Scheme was to seize *Copenhagen* and the *Sound*, and afterwards to transport his Army again into *Germany*, to put Affairs there in a Posture conformable to his own Views.

Most certain it is, that such was the Behaviour of the *Russians*, when they declared in the Month of *September* 1716, that they would not make the Descent, that the Court of *Denmark* was extremely alarmed at it, and took such Precautions for the Security of *Copenhagen*, as would have baffled the Project of seizing that Place, if the *Russians* had attempted it. It was on this Account that his *Danish* Majesty caused his Cavalry to decamp from the Ground where the *Russians* had formed their Incampment on their landing, and to post themselves in another Camp, so that the Town lay between both.

At that Season of the Year the Czar might have returned by Sea with all his Forces to his Dominions, had he been minded to sail when he declared he had laid aside the Descent on *Schonen* ; but as the Design of that Prince was to winter his Troops in *Germany* (as the Event shewed soon after) his Ministers seeking only to spin out Time till the latter part of the Season, amused the other Ministers at *Copenhagen* for two Months, with frivolous Projects for the Operations of the ensuing Campaign : And it was not till the 22d of *October* that his Czarish Majesty caused a Memorial to be delivered to Admiral *Norris*, importing, that if the King would engage to send a Squadron into the *Baltick* in the Month of *May* or *June* 1717, with Orders to cover the Descent, which in that Case the Czar promised to make in *Sweden* on the Side of *Finland*, his Czarish Majesty would engage on his part to withdraw his Forces out of the Empire, those however excepted who were on board the Gallies, which could not possibly sail before the Spring.

THE Czar also endeavoured at that Time to perswade his *Danish* Majesty to keep 15 or 20 *Russian* Batallions and 1000 Horse, and to let the *Russian* Fleet winter in the Port of *Copenhagen* : But those Offers being too suspicious to be accepted, his Czarish Majesty at length proceeded to execute his true Design, and in the End of *October* landed with all his Forces in *Mecklenburg*, where he

he strengthened himself in such a Manner, by raising excessive Contributions on the Nobility, and by erecting Magazines at *Rosstock*, that there was no longer room to doubt he would push on his Projects in the Empire, and form very dangerous Engagements: Not contenting himself with openly supporting the Duke of *Mecklenburg* in the unjust Oppression of his Nobility, he even made Proposals to that Duke for yielding to him *Mecklenburg*, in Exchange for an Equivalent that he would give him in *Livonia*.

THE *Russians* were never without Pretexes for wintering in a Country where they found themselves so much at Ease. One while the advanced Season would not permit their Gallies to put to Sea: Another Time Provisions were wanting for subsisting the Forces in their Passage: Sometimes the Transports were not in a Condition for a longer Voyage: And sometimes the *Swedish* Fleet was come out from *Carlsroon*, and was cruising in the *Baltick*.

In the mean while Endeavours were used to form Engagements in the Empire, and particularly with the King of *Prussia*, with whom his Czarish Majesty had an Interview at *Havelsberg* the End of *November*, without communicating any thing to the King about the Subject of that Conference, though it was held in the Neighbourhood of *Gobre*, where his Majesty was then.

His Majesty seeing Things were come to this Pass, was willing to employ with the Czar the Office of a Friend and Ally, in causing Representations to be made to him in the most obliging Manner, of the Mischiefs he was doing himself by such Proceedings. Upon this the Czar sent M. *Tolstoy* to *Hanover* (whither His Majesty was returned the 30th of *November*) to give Hopes in general Terms, that the *Russian* Forces should evacuate the Empire. But when it was proposed to fix a Term for the March of those Forces, M. *Tolstoy* would never consent to it. His Majesty's Ministers kept to the same Point, the End of *January* at the *Hague*, in their Way to attend the King to *England*; M. *Tolstoy*, who had followed, was seconded by Prince *Kourakin*, and gave new Hopes of the speedy March of their Master's Forces: But all came to nothing, because the said Gentlemen refused to fix a Term for that March; and it was plainly seen by all those Proceedings, that their only Design was to gain Time, and to amuse People with general and illudory Promises of withdrawing the said Forces, which the Czar was far from really intending.

THE King arrived at *London* the 30th of *January* 1717, and the Czar's Resident, M. *Wesselofski*, having complained by a Memorial in *April*, that his Majesty had addressed himself to the Emperor, and the King of *Denmark*, to desire them to press the Czar on their Part, to evacuate *Mecklenburg*; the King caused a Resolution in Writing to be delivered to the said Resident, importing, That His Majesty having very much at Heart the maintaining a perfect Intelligence with the Czar; and seeing that

nothing tended more to break it, than the Stay of the *Russian* Forces in the Empire; he had made the most earnest Instances to his Czarish Majesty to withdraw them from thence, being thereto obliged, as a Friend and Ally of the Czar, as a Neighbour to the Country of *Mecklenburg*, and as Director of the Circle of the *Lower Saxony*; and having seen with Regret, that his Instances had been of no Effect, his Majesty had caused the Emperor and the King of *Denmark* to be moved to concur with him; finding himself obliged to take this Step, by his Engagements with his Imperial Majesty, by the Rank he held, as well in the Empire, as in the Circle, and by the great Interest he could not but have in the Tranquillity and Quiet of his Neighbourhood. It was added, That His Majesty was no less moved to this, by the Consideration of the Prejudice which the Stay of the *Russian* Forces in *Germany*, would infallibly bring upon the Czar, seeing he was in Danger of drawing upon himself the Head and the Members of the Empire. To conclude, It was set forth how necessary it was to remove an Obstruction which destroyed all Confidence, and consequently all Concert and Harmony between the Northern Allies; and which deprived them of all Hopes of being able to act against his *Swedish* Majesty, in a manner sufficient to oblige him to accept reasonable Conditions of Peace.

It must be owned, that the Czar's Ministers, on their Part, continued to propose the forming of a Plan of Operations, for supporting the Czar in the Descent, which they said he would make in Person, in the Heart of *Sweden*, on the Side of *Finland*: But this Project could no longer be looked upon as seriously intended, because it was absolutely inconsistent with the Stay of the *Russians* in *Mecklenburg*, where the Flower of the Czar's Troops were, and, among others, his Regiment of Life Guards, without which he never hazarded his own Person in any Expedition.

THE Czar's Ministers alledged, that their Master ought not to evacuate *Mecklenburg* without having procured Satisfaction to the Duke-upon his Differences with his Nobility; but as the *Russian* Forces had no manner of Right to settle in that Dutchy, much less to live there at Discretion, how could his Czarish Majesty pretend to annex to the withdrawing of his Forces, a Condition which implied no less than the overthrowing of the Constitution of the Empire, and the hindering of the free Course of Justice, by taking from the proper and competent Judges the Decision of the Differences in Question?

THIS true and faithful Narration, Sir, sufficiently shews you the just Reasons of Complaint His Majesty had in the Quality of a Member of the Empire; and it is to be observed, that it was only in that Quality His Majesty was in Alliance with the Czar, and in War with *Sweden*; which serves to refute the perpetual Sophistry that runs through the Memorial, where, almost in every

ry Page, the Engagements of His Majesty, as King, are confounded with those which did not bind him otherwise than in the Quality of Elector.

It is certain that His Majesty, who could not join in the Plans of Operations proposed by the Czar, but in the latter Quality, had good Grounds for refusing his Consent, unless the *Russian* Forces were first withdrawn out of *Mecklenburg*, where they gave the whole Empire just Cause of Jealousy, and where they were out of the way of being employed in the Descent proposed. But the Czar was so far from consenting to their marching out, that he continued to render that pretended Project of a Descent altogether impracticable, by insisting not only on a *British* Squadron to assist in it, but also by demanding that this Squadron should be under the Orders of the *Russian* Admiral, which was throwing the most insuperable and odious Obstruction in the Way of that Project.

MEANWHILE, as the King's Instances for evacuating *Mecklenburg*, however just in themselves and conformable to the Czar's true Interest, clashed with that Prince's favourite Project of establishing himself in *Germany* at any Rate, they were taken in very ill Part; so that they may be looked upon as constituting the Epocha of that Animosity which appeared afterwards against His Majesty on all Occasions, as will be seen by the Sequel of this Narration.

THE Czar thought so little of going to *Petersburg*, (as would have been necessary in order to make Preparations there for so considerable a Descent, had that really been his Project,) that he had absolutely resolved to go to *Amsterdam* and pass the Winter there, and part of the Summer at *Paris*, with Views quite different from what was then pretended. Accordingly he arrived at *Amsterdam* on the 17th of *December* 1716, having taken his Way through the Country of *Bremen*, to avoid passing by *Hanover*, or through its Neighbourhood.

THE breaking out of Count *Gyllenburg's* Affair about that Time, upon the seizing of that Count at *London*, and of Baron *Gortz* at *Arnheim*, and the printing of their Letters, gave the Publick the first Notion of the new Views of his Czarish Majesty, which were turned to a Negotiation of a separate Peace with *Sweden*, by the Intervention of Baron *Gortz*, and upon Engagements with the Pretender, by means of a *Scotchman*, the Czar's Physician, named *Erskine*, a Relation of Lord *Mar*.

DIVERS Particulars relating to these two Points are to be found in the Letters of *Gortz* and *Gyllenburg*, who were at the Source of those Intrigues, and whose Testimony could not be suspected; however, the whole was disowned by the Czar and his Ministers, it being not yet time to let those Mysteries take Vent.

THE Pretender's Emissaries did not neglect the Opportunity of the Czar's staying in *Holland*, from the 7th of *December* 1716, till the Beginning of *April* 1717, when his Czarish Majesty set out for the *Netherlands* and *France*. Mr. *J——n*, an *English* Papist, having the Pretender's Credentials, and Sir *Hugo Paterfon*, Lord *Mar's* Brother-in-Law, found free Access to the Physician *Erskine*, and concerted with him divers Projects in Favour of their Master, and even Lord *Mar's* Journey to *Liege*, which however he could not perform before the Month of *August* the same Year. The said Emissaries established a Correspondence between the *Russian* Court and the *Swedish* Resident at the *Hague*; and the Overtures made by Baron *Gortz* before he was seized, were pursued, during his Confinement, with the same Vigour as they could have been by himself, had he been at full Liberty.

THE Czar, full of these new Schemes, arrived at *Paris* the 7th of *May*: It is well known what Proposals he made to the Court of *France*, offering to pour a numerous Army into the Heart of the Empire, to be at the Disposition of that Crown, provided they paid him the large Subsidies which he demanded; but those Offers were rejected, as inconsistent with the Engagements *France* was under by the defensive Alliance signed at the *Hague* the 4th of *January* 1717, with His *Britannick* Majesty and the States General.

THE Czar returned from *Paris* to *Amsterdam* on the 2d of *August*; Baron *Gortz* had been set at Liberty the Evening before, and having had several Conferences with the *Swedish* Resident at *Zutphen*, he had an Interview with his Czarish Majesty and his Ministers at *Loo*, the End of *August*; and have taken upon himself to adjust all the Differences between the King of *Sweden* and the Czar, within three Months after his Arrival in *Sweden*, he set out thither by the Way of *Revel*, furnished with a Passport from his Czarish Majesty, who on his Side engaged absolutely to suspend all Operations against his *Swedish* Majesty till the End of the said three Months.

So far was the Czar from acquainting the King with this Interview at *Loo*, and what had been treated there, that, on the contrary, he took the utmost Care to conceal it; and when His Majesty's Resident at *Petersburg* afterwards reproached the Czar's Ministers with it, they made no Scruple flatly to deny that there was ever any such Interview.

THE Czar having, during his Stay at *Paris*, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with *France*, in which his *Prussian* Majesty was also included, was pressingly exhorted by the Regent to withdraw his Forces from *Mecklenburg*, and he promised it. The King, who would not lose any Opportunity of renewing good Intelligence with the Czar, knowing the said Prince would, in his Return from *Paris*, pass in *August* by *Amsterdam*, sent to him Ad-
miral

miral Norris and Mr. Whitworth, with Orders to thank him for having thus declared himself at *Paris*, about the withdrawing of his Forces out of the Empire; and to assure him, that it would be Matter of great Satisfaction to his Majesty, to live with him in the same Friendship and Union as before, and to resume the Negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce, which, on his Side, he would facilitate with all possible Readiness.

BUT the Czar having again insisted on a *British* Squadron of 15 Men of War to act against *Sweden*, under the Orders of the *Russian* Admirals; this Step of His Majesty had no better Effect than any other before.

AT the End of the Month of *July* 1717, the *Russian* Forces marched out of *Mecklenburg*, except 3000 Men left there in the Duke's Service, who laid all the Burthen of their Subsistence on his Nobility.

THOUGH the *Russian* Court took Care to cry up the withdrawing of their Forces as a meritorious Act, in several Places, and even with the King and the Regent of *France*; yet the true Motive of it became publick, by the Memorial which his Czarish Majesty's Vice-Chancellor drew up, to advise him to take other Measures than for the time past.

" IN that Memorial he represented to the Czar, that if he
" made a Peace with *Sweden* in Conjunction with his Allies,
" the Complaisance he would be obliged to shew them, would
" make him lose Part of the Conquests he had made, because
" his *Swedish* Majesty in this Case making considerable Cessions
" to the Kings of *Great Britain*, *Denmark*, and *Prussia*, would
" thereby find it necessary to stand upon higher Terms with the
" Czar.

" THAT the mediating Powers would always be more favour-
" ably inclined to the other Northern Allies, than to his Czarish
" Majesty.

" That therefore the only Way for him to take, was to over-
" power the King of *Sweden*, by transporting all his Forces into
" his Kingdom, and thereby force him to accept such Conditions
" as he would prescribe him: And the Czar having so just Rea-
" sons of Complaint against his Allies, would be very much in
" the Right to make thus his own separate Peace without any
" Mediator.

" THE Memorial afterwards sets forth the pretended Offences
" given to the Czar by their *Britannick*, *Danish* and *Prussian* Ma-
" jesties; and added as to *Poland*, that whereas that King never
" was admitted to any Share in the Conquests, neither ought he
" to come in for any Thing at the Conclusion of the Peace.

" THE Memorial further shews, how easily the Czar might
" transport 80,000 Men into *Sweden*, by a very short Passage;
" which Effort would the sooner oblige the King of *Sweden* to
" accept

“ accept the Conditions imposed by the Conqueror, because he would thereby find Means to retake from the other Northern Allies, what they had taken from him.”

THE Czar left *Holland* with a Resolution to employ his whole Thoughts on the Execution of this Project, in case Baron *Gortz* should not be able by his Persuasions to bring the King of *Sweden* to the Point his Czarish Majesty desired. And it was on Account of this great Design that he withdrew his Forces out of *Germany*, to have them near at Hand against *Sweden*, in order to terrify the *Swedes*, and to facilitate the Negotiation of Baron *Gortz*.

THE Czar having left *Amsterdam* on the 2d of *September*, went by *Cleves* and *Wezel* to *Berlin*, from whence he set out the 22d of the same Month for *Dantzick*, and from thence the 2d of *October* for *Petersbourg*, where he arrived the 21st of *November*.

M. *Weber*, his Majesty's Resident at *Petersburg*, who, during the Czar's Absence, had left that Place and returned to *Hanover*, was then sent back to his Post, and arrived at *Petersburg* the 9th of *December* 1717, with Orders to thank the Czar for the obliging Letters he had written from *Amsterdam* to his Majesty by Admiral *Norris*, and to assure him of the King's good Dispositions for maintaining with him the same Union and Friendship as formerly. He discharged this Commission to the Czar's Ministers, and at the same Time gave them to understand how uneasy his Majesty was at the Interview the Czar had had at *Loo* with Baron *Gortz*, and at the Appearances there were that his Czarish Majesty had employed that Baron to endeavour to procure a separate Peace with his *Swedish* Majesty.

THE Czar's Ministers boldly denied that there had been an Interview at *Loo*, (though a little Time after they were obliged to own it.) They put on a Face of extreme Surprize at the mention of a Negotiation for a separate Peace with *Sweden*; they disowned it with Oaths, and wondered that the *British* Court could have given any Credit to such Advices.

THE late Duke of *Ormond* was then lurking at *Mittau* by the Czar's Connivance. His Design was not only to negotiate the Pretender's Marriage with a Niece of that Prince, but also to go over to *Sweden* to persuade his *Swedish* Majesty to make Peace with the Czar, and to turn all his Thoughts upon setting the Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*.

THAT Duke sent Mr. *J——n*, (of whom mention has already been made) to *Sweden*, to obtain Leave from his *Swedish* Majesty for himself to go thither in the Quality of the Pretender's Minister. *J——n* had Orders to apply to Baron *Gortz*, which he did accordingly; but the Answer he brought to the Duke was, that the King of *Sweden* had great Reasons for not ad-

admitting him: After which, the Czar likewise, on his Part, refused to admit the Duke at *Petersbourg*, where the Presence of a Person so well known would have too much laid open his favourable Intentions for the Pretender, which it was not yet Time to disclose. It was therefore judged more proper to send the Duke away from *Mittau*, and to treat secretly at *Petersbourg* with Mr. *J. — n*, a Person who had Credentials from the Pretender, and who had a great Share in his Confidence. It is proper to observe here, that the King of *Sweden*, by refusing Admittance to the late Duke of *Ormond* and the other *Jacobites*, shewed more Regard for his *Britannick* Majesty, though he was his Enemy in the Quality of Elector, than the Czar did, though he was in Alliance with him.

In the mean Time all Things were under-hand preparing for forming a Congress; and the Great Master of the Ordnance, *Bruce*, and Counsellor *Osterman*, were seen all on a sudden setting out from *Petersbourg*, the first on the 17th, and the other on the 19th of *January* 1718. The former made no Mystery of his going to *Finland*, but he gave out he went to view the Artillery, the Places, and Magazines, and to prepare all Things for a vigorous Campaign against *Sweden*. But M. *Osterman*, who had no such Pretences to alledge, was very much at a Loss what to say. He had all along affected to treat the Resident *Weber* as a Friend, and even as a Confident. The said Resident, who had Intelligence of the true Occasion of his Journey, talked to him upon it in strong Terms, and represented to him how great Reason his *Britannick* Majesty would have to take it ill, that the Design of negotiating a Peace with *Sweden* should be made a Mystery of to him, at a Time when Plenipotentiaries were actually setting out for that End; desiring him to reflect on the disagreeable Effects which a Proceeding so contrary to the Friendship and Alliance established between their Masters must of Necessity produce. M. *Osterman*, with most horrid Oaths, swore there was no such Thing on Foot, and that the Czar was far from such Thoughts; adding, that as for himself, he was going to the Czar, who was then at *Moscow*, being obliged, as he said, to carry some Papers of Importance to the Vice-Chancellor *Schaffiroff*: Yet he set out a few Hours after for *Abo*, making great Halte after Mr. *Bruce*, in order to open the Conferences with the Plenipotentiaries of his *Swedish* Majesty. This was done upon Baron *Gortz's* Letters of Invitation, who promised to repair without Delay to the Congress. But after having made those two Gentlemen wait at *Abo* in vain for above two Months, he proposed, by Letters, the Isle of *Aland*, and to have convenient Houses built there for their Assembling; which the *Russian* Court, though very much vexed at all those Delays, agreed

to; so apprehensive were they of seeing that Negotiation miscarry.

THE Czar returned from *Moscow* to *Petersbourg* on the 3d of *April*; and notwithstanding his extreme Impatience to hear of Baron *Gortz's* Arrival at *Aland*, that Baron did not arrive there till the 17th of *May*; Count *Gyllenburg* having come thither some Days before. Hence it is easy to judge of the Solidity of the Pretext alledged at that Time by the Czar's Ministers for justifying those Conferences, viz. that their Master could not help hearkening to the Propositions the King of *Sweden* was willing to make to him; it being very unlikely, had his *Swedish* Majesty been willing to make the first Advances and Overtures, that he would have thus wearied out the Patience of the *Russian* Plenipotentiaries, by making them wait four Months at *Abo*.

ALL these Intrigues of the *Russian* Court, and particularly the Interview at *Loo* with Baron *Gortz*, obliged his Majesty to send the Counsellor *Schrader* to *Sweden* in the Month of *March* 1718, to learn the State of Affairs there, and to inform himself of his *Swedish* Majesty's Dispositions, and what Grounds there were for the Rumours which were spread of a separate Peace being near concluded between *Sweden* and his Czarish Majesty. The said Counsellor repaired to *Lunden* in *Schonen*, and after about three Weeks Stay returned to *England*, without having seen the King of *Sweden*, who was then at *Stromstat*. The Author of the Memorial affirms, that this Journey of M. *Schrader* determined the Czar to form the Congress of *Aland*: But he ought to have remembered, that the Czar's two Plenipotentiaries had set out from *Petersbourg* for *Abo* in the Middle of *January* the same Year 1718.

IN the mean time the *Jacobites* were not idle; The Physician, *Erskine*, their great Patron, seconded by Sir *Harry Stirling*, his Relation, took the utmost Care to recommend their Interests to the Czar; and Mr. *J——n*, who arrived at *Petersbourg* the End of *May*, found Access to the Czar's Ministers, and delivered to the Vice-Chancellor a Memorial, recommending to him the Pretender's Interests; laying Stress upon the Care which he, *J——n*, had taken, when in *Sweden*, to incline his *Swedish* Majesty towards the Czar, and inspire him with Sentiments of Peace; and desiring, that as soon as that Peace should be concluded, the Czar would be pleased to assist the King of *Sweden* in attempting the projected Expedition to *Scotland*. *J——n* has boasted, that he had positive Assurances on the Czar's Part, from his Ministers, that he should be very glad to do any Service for the Pretender; that M. *Osterman* had Orders to declare to Baron *Gortz*, that such were the Intentions of his Czarish Majesty;

jesty; and that he, the said *J——n*, might thereupon correspond with the said Baron.

THE same *J——n* was even employed in negotiating by Letters, with his good Friend the *Spanish* Embassador at the *Hague*, a Plan of an Alliance between the King of *Spain*, the King of *Sweden*, and the Czar, into which they hoped to engage also the King of *Sardinia*, by Means of the *Jacobites*, who were in *Italy*; and the frequent Interviews there were at that Time between the Czar's Minister at the *Hague*; and the Minister of the Catholick King, sufficiently shewed, that the *Russian* Court were very earnest in pushing on that Negotiation. Accordingly, a little after it came to be known that the King of *Spain* was solicited on the Part of the Czar, to enter with him into an Offensive Alliance against the King; and it appears now, by very fresh Information, that the same Offers were renewed last Autumn; and that the Czar then sought the King of *Spain's* Friendship and Alliance, in Favour of the Pretender, against his *Britannick* Majesty: And this not only by his Ministers at *Paris*, and the *Hague*, but even at *Madrid* also, proposing in particular the Invasion of *Scotland*: And that the Affair would have been concluded, had it not been for the King of *Spain*, who, before putting the last Hand to it, was willing first to expect that the Czar had made Peace with the Queen of *Sweden*, and so might be in a Condition to make good the Engagements which he offered to enter into.

DURING the Time that *J——n's* Memorials were so favourably received, and that he had such flattering Hopes given him, the Czar's Ministers boldly denied to the Resident *Weber*, that there was such a Man at *Petersbourg*; and as they could not deny that Sir *Harry Stirling* was there, they assured the said Resident, that the Czar had ordered that Gentleman to depart his Dominions, which however was not done; on the contrary, the Czar being gone to *Revel* at the End of *July*, Sir *Harry Stirling* had Leave to follow him, and to take Care there of the Pretender's Affairs during *J——n's* Absence, who staid behind at *Petersburg*.

BARON *Gortz* having left Count *Gyllenburg* at *Aland*, to continue the Conferences, went to the King of *Sweden* to know his last Intentions. He returned to *Aland* in the Month of *August*. The Czar was then with his Fleet at *Hangoe*, and had given Leave to Sir *Harry Stirling* likewise to be there, that he might the sooner be acquainted with the Resolutions which Baron *Gortz* was to bring from the King of *Sweden* relating to the Pretender. The Czar's whole Campaign passed in perfect Inaction. He was unwilling to disturb, by the least Hostility, the pacifick Projects that were then on foot.

HIS Czarish Majesty went, with his Gallies and his Guards, from *Hangoe* to *Abo*, to be nearer to the Negotiations, and to influence them the more. The Ministers of the Northern Allies, who had followed the Czar to *Revel*, were obliged to remain there. Only Baron *Mardefeld*, his *Prussian* Majesty's Envoy, was permitted to go to *Abo*. All the Instances which the Ministers of their *Britannick*, *Danish*, and *Polish* Majesties made for obtaining the same Permission, were in vain. They were advised to return from *Revel* to *Petersburg*, to expect the Czar there; and they were never told any thing of what was negotiating at *Aland*, but in a dark and mysterious Manner.

THE Czar returned to *Petersburg* on the 14th of *September*, after the most pacifick Campaign that ever was known.

BARON *Gortz*, after his Return from the King of *Sweden*, had many and long Conferences at *Aland*, with the Plenipotentiaries of his Czarish Majesty, who was then at *Abo*, to give them his Directions. The Result was, that Baron *Gortz* should return to *Sweden* a second Time, to prevail with his *Swedish* Majesty to approve the Plan settled at *Aland*, and to bring back his Consent. For this Purpose he set out from *Aland* the End of *September*.

THE Conferences were in the mean time continued with Count *Gyllenburg* for Form-sake; and the Czar relied so much on the fair Promises which Baron *Gortz* had made him, that he had consented to the Exchange of General *Reenschild*, and had sent him back to *Sweden*.

THE main Point which the Czar had in View, was to keep by a Peace, not only *Ingria*, and part of *Carelia*, but also *Revel* with *Esthonia*, and *Riga* with *Livonia*. He designed to restore to *Sweden* only *Finland* and *Carelia*, that Part excepted which was to be dismembered from the latter Province.

BARON *Gortz*, it seems, flattered the Czar with those Hopes, and expected to persuade the King of *Sweden* to consent to those Cessions, in Consideration of the Succours by Sea and Land, which his Czarish Majesty was to furnish to that King, as well for re-establishing *Stanislaus* on the Throne of *Poland*, as for retaking from the Kings of *Great Britain* and *Denmark* what they had taken from the Crown of *Sweden*. As to the King of *Prussia*, he was to be included in the Treaty; but the Czar, the better to make his own Terms, engaged to prevail with his *Prussian* Majesty to restore *Stetin*, with its District, for an Equivalent to be given to him somewhere else. It will be easier to judge of all these Views, by reading the Plans concerted between Baron *Gortz* and *M. Osterman*. I have thought proper to insert them here, Word for Word, so as they were found among the Papers of the said Baron, after his tragical Death.

PLAN concerted between Baron Gortz and M. Osterman, the Czar's second Plenipotentiary, for Peace between that Prince and the King of Sweden.

- " I. **T**HE Czar promises and takes upon himself to see the Treaty of *Alt Ransfat* executed according to its literal Sense, so that the Republick of *Poland* shall make no further Difficulty to acknowledge for the future *Stanislaus* for their lawful King, and to receive him in that Quality.
- " To this End the Czar shall send, next Spring, into *Poland*, an Army of 80,000 Men at least. His *Swedish* Majesty, to second this Project, shall go over to *Germany* at the same Time with a numerous Army, which shall act in Concert with that of the Czar in the same View; and in case any Power should concern itself with the Affairs of *Poland*, and endeavour to hinder the re establishing of the Peace of *Alt Ransfat*, their *Swedish* and Czarish Majesties engage not to lay down their Arms before King *Stanislaus* be actually replaced on the Throne of *Poland*: They engage to maintain him upon it with all their Forces, and to preserve the Republick of *Poland* in the quiet and entire Liberty of chusing their Kings.
- " II. His Czarish Majesty offers his Mediation between his *Swedish* Majesty and the King of *Prussia* for re-establishing good Intelligence between those two Princes; in Consequence whereof his said Czarish Majesty will employ all Means for accommodating, in a friendly Manner, the Differences relating to *Stetin* and the Territories possessed in *Pomerania*, as also relating to the demolishing of *Wismar*. But if the King of *Prussia* should refuse to give the King of *Sweden* reasonable Satisfaction for *Stetin* and its District, the two contracting Parties shall act in Concert to procure to the King of *Prussia* another Equivalent to his Convenience, which shall cost *Sweden* nothing. In Return, the King of *Prussia* shall be obliged to restore to the Crown of *Sweden*, *Stetin*, and that Part of *Pomerania* which did belong to it, to become Guarantee of the Treaty to be made between that Crown and the Czar, and to conclude with them a defensive Alliance, pursuant to the Plan formed on this Subject.
- " AND this Alliance with *Prussia* shall be concluded to the mutual Satisfaction of the Parties, two Months after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty between *Sweden* and *Muscovy*.
- " III. THE Czar not only thinks it just, that for the considerable Countries and Provinces which the King of *Sweden* yields

“ yields up to him, he should have convenient Satisfaction and
 “ an Equivalent elsewhere ; but he even obliges himself to pro-
 “ cure them to him ; and in case the King of *Sweden* thinks an
 “ Equivalent on the Side of *Norway* convenient for him, the
 “ Czar will undertake, by Force of Arms, the Execution of this
 “ Project.

“ If the King of *Sweden* will pass over into *Germany* with a
 “ Body of 40000 Men, the Czar shall join to it 20 or 25000 Men
 “ of the Army which he shall have in *Poland* ; he shall maintain
 “ them at his own Expence, and they shall act under the King of
 “ *Sweden*'s Orders, for executing the Plan which he shall have
 “ formed. If any other Powers should pretend to oppose it, the
 “ Czar engages to act against them with all his Forces ; stipula-
 “ ting however, that the Equivalent which the King of *Swe-*
 “ *den* shall take from *Denmark*, shall not consist of any Country
 “ on this Side of the *Baltick*.

“ THE Operations at Sea shall be made in concert between
 “ the two contracting Powers, and the Czar promises to join all
 “ his naval Forces with those of *Sweden*.

“ IV. THE Czar promises and engages to act with all his
 “ Troops, to compel the King of *England* as Elector, not only
 “ to restore *Bremen* and *Verden* to the King of *Sweden*, but also
 “ to give him due Satisfaction for the Damages he has sustained ;
 “ and if it happens that the Crown of *England* should oppose this,
 “ the two contracting Powers promise to unite all their Forces
 “ against it, and not to lay down their Arms till that Restitution
 “ and Satisfaction be really obtained from *Hanover*.

“ HOWEVER, in case the King of *Sweden* should chuse, be-
 “ fore the Exchange of the Ratifications, to excuse the Czar
 “ from this Obligation ; his Czarish Majesty promises and takes
 “ upon himself, to dispose the Duke of *Mecklenburg* to yield up
 “ voluntarily, and for ever, to the King and Crown of *Sweden*,
 “ the Dutchy of *Mecklenburg* and its Dependencies, for a pro-
 “ per Equivalent which the Czar promises to procure for that
 “ Duke ; and as such Equivalent cannot be found but on the
 “ Side of *Poland*, the King of *Sweden* shall engage to assist in
 “ getting it.

“ AND in this Case, the Agreements about the Successions of
 “ Families, which are subsisting between the Houses of *Prussia*
 “ and *Mecklenburg*, shall take Place, with respect to the Equi-
 “ valent to be given to the Duke of that Name.

“ V. FURTHER, the two contracting Parties shall invite
 “ other Powers to enter into this Treaty of Alliance, and they
 “ shall maintain between themselves good Friendship, Confide-
 “ dence, and Neighbourhood.

*Conditions concerted between Baron Gortz and M. Osterman, the
Czar's second Plenipotentiary, for attaining Peace.*

- " I. **T**HERE shall be a perpetual Peace and Alliance be-
" tween the two Crowns.
" II. **G**ENERAL Friendship.
" III. **F**OR establishing a more strict Friendship and Confi-
" dence, the two contracting Powers agree to exchange certain
" Territories and Countries, and to settle a new Frontier be-
" tween their Dominions.
" IV. **T**HE Czar promises to restore to *Sweden*, the Great
" Dutchy of *Finland*, and all that depends on it.
" V. **T**HE Province of *Carelia*, except what shall be dis-
" membered from it.
" VI. **T**HE Powers shall settle a new Frontier for the future.
" N. B. **T**HIS Barrier is indeed not specified in the Project,
" but a geographical Map was joined to it, in which is seen a
" Line drawn from *Wyburg* to the *White Sea*, passing by the
" Lakes of *Ladoga* and *Onega*, and the Countries on this Side of
" that Line, were to be yielded up for ever to *Sweden*.
" VII. **A**ND whereas, the Czar promises to procure to the
" King and the Crown of *Sweden*, what shall be for his Conve-
" nience in another part, and to indemnify him intirely, his
" *Swedish* Majesty yields to the Czar, and to the Crown of
" *Russia* for ever, &c.
" N. B. **B**ARON Gortz has not named those Cessions in the
" Project, referring them to the Pleasure and Decision of the
" King of *Sweden*; but it is evident by the Line above-menti-
" oned, that they were to consist of part of *Carelia*, all *Estho-*
" *nia*, *Livonia*, and *Ingria*.

Baron Gortz's Plan of Execution.

- " **W**HEREAS it is stipulated in the Treaty with the Czar,
" that the Peace with *Prussia* shall be concluded in some
" manner or other, *Prussia* must necessarily be engaged in this
" Plan.
" I. **I**MEDIATELY after the Conclusion of the Peace, the
" King of *Sweden*, the Czar, and the King of *Prussia*, shall
" endeavour to bring together as much Shipping as is necessary
" for transporting 40000 Men, and those Ships shall be in *Swe-*
" *den* before the Winter, that they may be put in a Condition
" to serve for transporting those Forces as soon as the Sea shall
" be open.
" II. **I**N the mean Time the Czar shall keep in Readiness the
" Men of War stipulated by the Auxiliary Treaty, to the End
" they

“ they may be able to join the *Swedish* Fleet as soon as the Sea shall be open.

“ III. LIKEWISE the Czar shall take Care that the Body of auxiliary Forces from 20 to 25000 Men, designed for *Mecklenburg*, be actually there before the Arrival of the Transports from *Sweden*.

“ IV. WHEN all these Forces shall have joined on t’other Side, the Body of *Russians* shall march directly to the Country of *Lanzburg*, with whom the King of *Sweden* shall cause 6000 *Hessians* to join, and shall endeavour to get also some Troops from the neighbouring Princes.

“ V. BUT the King of *Sweden* shall go with his Army into *Holstein* and *Futland*, and remain there; partly to try whether *Denmark* by this Step only may be induced to yield to Peace; and partly to be at Hand to support the Body of *Russians*, in case Succours should come to the *Hanoverians*.

“ VI. THE two Fleets shall keep together all the Year, and endeavour to stop the Passage of the *Belts*, to the End the *Danish* Troops in *Holstein* and *Futland* may not return into *Zealand*, nor any be sent from thence into *Holstein*; and for the rest, they shall do all that is possible to keep the *Danish* Fleet shut up, and to cut off all Communication with *Denmark* from Abroad.

“ VII. IN the mean time the Czar shall remain with an Army of at least 60000 Men in *Poland*, without declaring his true Intentions. On the contrary, under his Mediation a Treaty shall be set on Foot between the King of *Sweden* and King *Augustus*; and that Negotiation shall be spun out till the Affair with *Hanover* and *Denmark* be ended. Then that of *Poland* shall be jointly undertaken in Favour of *Stanislaus*.

“ VIII. As for what relates to *England*, the two Parties shall take their Measures to disable the Court from engaging the Nation in any Proceedings contrary to these Schemes: The like shall be done with respect to *Holland*.

“ IX. THE King of *Prussia* shall also draw together his Troops on that Side, which shall be judged most convenient for the common Cause.

You will allow, Sir, that these Pieces want no Commentary. They plainly shew a Design was laid for conquering *Norway*. The Czar obliges himself by these Plans to assist his *Swedish* Majesty by Force of Arms in that Expedition; and a little lower, the two contracting Parties promise to unite all their Forces against *Great Britain*, if it should intermeddle; which is declaring openly enough, that the Pretender’s Interest was in their View, and that it was resolved, after the Conquest of *Norway*,

to attempt in his Favour an Invasion in *Scotland*, which he had been so often put in Hopes of.

It ought to be considered above all things, that it was not so much Baron Gortz, as the *Muscovite* Court, who framed these Plans: For most certain it is, that his *Swedish* Majesty was resolved to insist on the Restitution of *Livonia* and *Esthonia*, and was very far from being willing to yield up to the Czar the important Place of *Revel*: But the Czar, who had a Mind to keep all his Conquests, except *Finland*, caused the said Plans to be drawn up to his own Liking by M. *Osterman*, and then gave them in trust to Baron Gortz, in Hopes that the Consideration of the powerful Assistance by Sea and Land, which he offered to the King of *Sweden*, for procuring him the Restitution of what the other Northern Allies withheld from him, and for restoring *Stanislaus*, he would be able to prevail with his *Swedish* Majesty to consent to the exorbitant Cessions he demanded of him. It is known, that Baron Gortz, when he left *Aland* to go to the King of *Sweden*, gave the *Russian* Plenipotentiaries to understand, that he was not without Hopes of persuading his *Swedish* Majesty to accept the Plans which he was carrying to him from the Czar.

DURING the Time that these rare Projects were in Agitation, the Czar's Resident at *London* continued to propose Plans of Operations against *Sweden*, and to profess his Czarish Majesty's Desire of living with the King in the most strict Friendship: These Protections were the Cause of sending the Resident *Jefferyes* to *Petersburg*.

HE set out from *London* in *October* 1718. Admiral *Norris*, who was still in the *Baltick* with his Squadron, had Orders to go with Mr. *Jefferyes* to the Czar's Court; but when the said Resident arrived at *Copenhagen* the 11th of *November*, he found that Admiral *Norris* had sailed with his Fleet some Days before to return to *England*, which obliged him to continue his Journey alone to *Petersburg*, where he did not arrive before the 15th of *January* 1719.

NEVER any thing could be more moderate than his Instructions were. He had Orders to make the most obliging Return to the Advances made by the Resident *Wesselofski*, and to declare, as to the Plans of Operations, that they chiefly regarded the Crown of *Denmark*, seeing it lay most exposed, and was threatened on the Part of the King of *Sweden*, with an Invasion in *Norway*.

HOWEVER, the Resident was to intimate, that it was not easy to concert with the Czar the Operations for pushing on the War against *Sweden*, at the Time when those two Powers were actually negotiating together at *Aland*, and when all *Europe* was expecting every Moment to hear that their Peace was made.

DOUBTLESS it must be allowed, that His *Britannick* Majesty could not explain himself upon the Plans of Operations, if it be considered, that he was well informed, that on the Czar's Part Concerts were demanded of him in Writing, only to produce them to the *Swedish* Plenipotentiaries at *Aland*, and thereby to determine the King their Master to consent to a separate Peace, for which his Czarish Majesty longed so ardently.

THE Resident *Jefferyes* had Orders also, modestly to complain of the good Reception the *Jacobites* still found at the Czar's Court, who had employed several of them in his Navy, and had lately considerably augmented their Pay for encouraging them to stay in his Service: The Resident was likewise to complain, that the Czar's Minister at *Paris* had done his utmost Endeavours to divert the Regent from signing the Quadruple Alliance, when at the same Time Prince *Kourakin* in his Station employed the most pressing Instances to hinder the States-General from acceding to it, and was labouring to form Engagements between his Court and that of *Spain*.

THE *Muscovite* Court expressed mighty Uneasiness at the Delays which Baron *Gortz* made to return to *Aland*, where he did not come back till the End of *November*, after above two Months Absence: The *Jacobites* lost about that Time the Physician *Ers-kinge*, but Sir *Harry Stirling*, on Pretence of claiming his Effects, continued at *Petersburg*, and remained charged with the Care of the Pretender's Interest.

THE Czar, in the mean time, kept exactly with the King of *Sweden* the Promise he had made to Baron *Gortz*, not to disturb his Majesty during his Expedition against *Norway*.

HIS *Danish* Majesty, who saw the Storm that was gathering, caused the most earnest Instances to be made to the Czar for his Assistance on so pressing an Occasion, either by Ships or by Subsidies, or by a Diversion in *Old Sweden*: But all was equally refused, and the King of *Sweden* was so well persuaded that the Czar would suspend all Operations, that he sent for his Battalion of Guards, and great Part of the Garrison of *Stockholm* to the Frontiers of *Norway*, leaving *Old Sweden* intirely unprovided. It has even been since discovered, that the *Muscovite* Court had excited his *Swedish* Majesty to undertake that Expedition, and that *M. Osterman* had Orders to discourse Baron *Gortz* about it at *Aland*. Accordingly they appeared under no Concern at *Petersburg*, to see his *Danish* Majesty embarrassed on the Side of *Norway*.

BARON *Gortz*, after a very short Stay at *Aland*, set out again from thence to go to the King his Master a third time; and it was not questioned at *Petersburg*, but this third Journey would give the finishing Stroke to the great Work of the separate Peace, on which their Heart was so much set; when all these Hopes were blasted by the Death of the King of *Sweden*, which hap-
pened

pened before *Frederickshall* the Night between the 10th and 11th of *December*, and was followed by the seizing and tragical Death of *Baron Gortz*.

So unforeseen a Blow gave a new Aspect to the Affairs of the North. At *Petersburg*, they at first expressed a great deal of Trouble and Consternation upon it: They were sensible, that this had overthrown all the Plans which *M. Osterman* had concerted with *Baron Gortz*. There was no further Prospect of a happy Issue of the Congress at *Aland*: In short, there was no more Room for flattering themselves with those important Cessions which *Baron Gortz* had undertaken to procure from the King of *Sweden*, in Consideration of the Succour of Forces and Shipping on the Part of the Czar.

SUCH were the first Impressions; but by little and little those Uneasinesses wore off. The deplorable Condition to which *Sweden* was reduced; so many Thousands of Men which it had lost by the excessive Cold, and by Want of Provisions, in the Retreat of its two Armies from *Nordenfiels* and *Sudenfiels*; and lastly, its Factions and intestine Divisions, created other Reflections at *Petersburg*: They saw that Kingdom without Forces, without a Fleet, without Money, without Corn, and without Allies. It was judged therefore, that the most favourable Opportunity for oppressing it was come, and all their Thoughts were turned on making such formidable Preparations to that End, that it was hoped the mere Apprehensions of them would induce the *Swedes* to submit to the Conditions which the Czar would prescribe to them.

THEY were confirmed in these Resolutions by the Advices which they received, that Princess *Ulrica* was declared Queen, and that the Duke of *Holstein* and his Party had lost their Point.

THEY had flattered themselves with Hopes, in case that Prince had been raised to the Throne, of resuming with him the Plans of the late *Baron Gortz*, and even his favourite Project, which was the said Duke's marrying into the Czar's Family, they would have been very glad of a new Pretext for causing the *Muscovite* Troops to return into *Germany*, to re-establish the said Duke (after they had entered into such Engagements with him) in his Dutchies of *Holstein* and *Sleswick*.

BUT the Resolution of the States of *Sweden*, the Manner of settling the Succession there, the Coronation of the Queen, and the Duke of *Holstein*'s preparing for his Departure; all these Circumstances laid together, made any other Design appear very impracticable, but that of a powerful Descent into the Heart of *Sweden*. It was wished however, that the said Crown, influenced by Terror, would ward off the Blow by undergoing those Laws that were designed to be imposed on them; to leave them a Door always open for it, his Czarish Majesty was willing that

the Congress at *Aland* should be kept up, and having sent for M. *Osterman* to *Petersburg* the Beginning of *February* 1719, to give him new Instructions, he caused the Conferences to be continued between M. *Bruce* and Count *Gyllenburg*, and did not send M. *Osterman* back till the Beginning of *April*, when the Queen of *Sweden* had taken the Resolution to nominate a new Plenipotentiary in the room of Baron *Gortz*, as accordingly she named soon after Baron *Lilienstet*, who however did not arrive till *June*.

THE Truth is, M. *Osterman* went to *Aland* rather to threaten than to negotiate, having Orders to declare to the *Swedes*, That if they did not accept within two Months Time the Conditions proposed, they must expect a Visit of 40000 Plenipotentiaries, who would compel them to it Sword in Hand.

THE King of *Sweden*'s Death had altered the Disposition of Men's Minds, with regard to the Crown of *Sweden*, almost in every Court. That of *France* favoured its antient Ally; besides, there appeared no longer that Danger of raising Troubles in the Empire, which might have been apprehended from so war-like and enterprizing a Prince as the late King was. The deplorable Condition in which he had left his Kingdom, which was wholly exhausted of Money, Troops, Ships, and Necessaries of Life, joined to intestine Divisions, made it no longer to be looked upon as a formidable Object. All Notion of seeing *Norway* conquered, and *Scotland* threatned, was now vanished. The only Point which the Protestant Powers had to determine, was, whether it was proper for them to see the Czar subdue a Protestant Kingdom which could give them no further Jealousy, and whether they ought to make a Sacrifice of it for aggrandizing a Prince so powerful already, and Master of *Livonia*, *Esthonia*, *Ingria*, *Carelia*, and *Finland*. The Czar was advancing with 30 Men of War, and 40000 Land Forces, at the same Time that the *Danes* having taken *Marsstrand* the End of *July*, and *Stromstat* soon after, were threatening *Schonen* with an Invasion.

HIS *Britanick* Majesty arrived at *Hanover* the End of *May*; he had nominated the Lord *Carteret* for his Ambassador in *Sweden*, after having received from the Queen the Letter of Notification of the Death of the King her Brother. His Majesty could do no less, not being at War with the Queen in the Quality of King of *Great Britain*.

THE Lord *Carteret* arrived at *Gottenburg* the 18th of *June*, and a few Days after at *Stockholm*; having been preceeded by Colonel *Bassewitz*, who was charged with the Affairs of the Electorate.

ADMIRAL *Norris* arrived the 3d of *July* with his Squadron in the Road of *Copenhagen*. That Month and the next were made remarkable by the Ravages and Burnings of the *Muscovites* on

on the *Swedish* Coasts. It is not proper to enlarge upon this Subject here ; it is yet fresh in every one's Memory, and I must forbear saying any thing that might seem to imply Reproach or Recrimination, or exasperate People's Minds still more. For this Reason I will pass over in Silence the opprobrious Discourses that were held then and long before at *Petersburg* against his *Britannick* Majesty and his Ministers, who were loaded with Invectives to that Degree, that the Word *Hanoverian* was never pronounced but with Signs of extraordinary Indignation : Nor will I say any thing of the Care which the Czar's Ministers, at Foreign Courts, took to decry his *Britannick* Majesty and his Government, and openly to thwart his Negotiations : But it is impossible to forbear taking Notice of the Czar's Letter to Admiral *Norris*, in which he asked him the Reason of his entering the *Baltick*, and what he was come to do there ? As if his *Britannick* Majesty needed the Czar's Permission for sending a Fleet thither. The Czar wanted above all things to know, whether the Admiral had Orders to traverse his Designs, and obstruct his Operations ; to which Sir *John Norris* thought it sufficient to answer, That he had no such Orders, which was very true.

THE Czar making no Doubt, but the burning of the Maritime Places in *Sweden* would induce the Nation to accept the hardest Conditions, sent M. *Osterman* to a Place near *Stockholm*, to propose to them his ultimate Resolutions, and to demand the absolute Cession of *Esthonia*, *Ingria*, and *Carelia*, comprehending therein the Towns of *Revel*, *Wyburg*, *Narva*, and *Kexholm*, and the Cession of *Livonia* for 40 Years, being willing to restore for the present only *Finland*.

THESE Propositions being calculated meerly for a separate Peace, and the Czar's sole Interests, it was time for the other Northern Allies to think likewise of theirs, independently of those of the Czar : It was time for Protestant Kings to prevent the entire Ruin of a Protestant Kingdom : In short, it was time for the said Kingdom to make its Peace with his *Britannick* Majesty and seek his Assistance ; and so it happened in the Month of *August*. M. *Osterman* was dismissed with a Denial ; a Treaty was signed, and Admiral *Norris* having joined Admiral *Sparre* in the Height of *Carelsroon*, arrived with his Fleet at *Stockholm* the 6th of *September*, and found that the *Russians* had retired to their own Harbours eight Days before. It was according to his *Britannick* Majesty's Desire that things happened thus, and that the *Russians* made their Retreat without being forced to it by Hostilities, which might have occasioned a Rupture. Thus Matters remained on a Foot of Negotiation ; and upon this Ground the Lord *Carteret* wrote to the Czar the 12th of *September*, to offer him the King's Mediation, which already had been offered at *Berlin* to M. *Tolstoy* by Mr. *Whitworth*. Tho Lord *Carteret* signified

signified to the Czar, that the Queen of *Sweden* had accepted that Mediation, (considering that *Great Britain* had never engaged in the Northern War) and that he hoped his Czarish Majesty would also accept it, and suspend Hostilities; adding, that his *Britannick* Majesty had given Orders to Admiral *Norris* to repair to the Coasts of *Sweden*, to protect the Commerce of the *British* Nation, and to give the greater Weight to his Mediation; and that his Majesty had taken Measures with the most Christian King, and with his other Allies (among which *Sweden* was comprehended) to procure a good Success of that Mediation, and to put an End to the War which had so long disturbed the North.

THE Lord *Carteret* had the greater Reason to make mention of his most Christian Majesty, because M. *Campredon* was arrived at *Stockholm* the 6th of *September* with the Character of Resident of *France*, and had brought with him 300,000 Crowns in Ingots of Gold, in Payment of six Months Subsidies, which the King his Master had newly agreed to give to *Sweden*.

THIS the Embassador's Letter, (to which Admiral *Norris* joined another of much the same Tenour) was carried by Mr. *Berkeley* to the *Russian* Plenipotentiaries at *Aland*; but they would neither charge themselves with sending these Letters to the Czar, nor give Mr. *Berkeley* a Passport for carrying them to *Petersburg*; so that he was obliged to carry them back to *Stockholm*. After which the Congress of *Aland* ended, the Plenipotentiaries taking their Leave on both Sides on the 24th of *September*.

THE Czar arrived at *Petersburg* the Beginning of the same Month, and the King seeing his Averseness to Peace and to the accepting of his Mediation, ordered his two Residents there, Mr. *Jefferyes* and M. *Weber* to retire to *Dantzick*, where they arrived the 14th of *November*. The King's Intentions were, that they should not go too far from *Petersburg*, but be at hand to go back thither, in case the Czar should resume pacific Thoughts, which is his Majesty's most sincere Desire.

I forbear, Sir, enlarging here upon divers Injuries done by the Czar to the Commerce of *Great Britain*. In the Month of *May* 1717, a *Russian* Captain took the *Concord*, a Ship of *Leith*, and carried her to the *Texel*. It is true, the Czar, after having caused the best Part of her Cargo to be taken out and confiscated, consented to her being sent to *London*, to be judged there according to the Laws of the Land, and so she was restored to the Owners, notwithstanding the Oppositions made by his Czarish Majesty's Resident. The same Year the *Russians* seized divers Effects belonging to Subjects of *Great Britain*, which were transporting to *Konigsberg*. In the following Years they took several *British* Ships. Their Privateers carried a great Number of them into

Revel

Revel in the Month of *April* 1719, and though they were not laden with any contraband Goods, yet they were declared good Prizes, the Ships and Cargoes were confiscated, and the Seamen thrown into Prison, or forced into the Czar's Sea Service. In *September* 1719, all the *British* Merchants at *Petersburg* being ordered to appear before the Court of Justice, were kept in Custody there during 24 Hours, and were not released till after they had been made to give Security that they would not go out of the Czar's Dominions. It would be easy for me to relate here many Facts more of this Nature, but these I think sufficient. I might even end here this Letter, Sir, since, after having read the faithful Narration I have made of the Conduct of the two Courts, you may easily judge (by drawing the Parallel) which of the two has Reason to complain of the other: Yet that nothing may be wanting, I will add some Remarks upon certain Passages of the Memorial that want Explanation.

THE Memorial begins with a Reproach, that the Steps made by the King of *Great Britain* in favour of *Sweden*, are entirely opposite to the Engagements entered into by his Majesty with the Czar in the Year 1715. 'Tis indeed going a little to fast to leap over four Years, and to pass by in perfect Silence the Conduct of the *Muscovite* Court during all that Time. The sincere and orderly Relation I have given you, sufficiently shews which of the two Courts was the first that departed from the Engagements of the Treaty 1715. The Project of seizing *Wismar*: The Design of settling in *Germany* under the Pretext of making a Descent in *Schonen*, though it was never thought of: The Slay of the *Russian* Troops in *Mecklenburg*, and the Exactions committed there: Their Contrivance of making a Place of Arms of a Country contiguous to the King's Dominions: Their Refusal to evacuate it upon his Majesty's most pressing Instances: Their March out of it afterwards with new Views, which were to terrify *Sweden*, and to force it to a separate Peace: The Interview with Baron *Gortz* for bringing about that Peace: The Congress at *Aland* formed without the Consent of the Northern Allies, and to which Admittance was constantly denied to his Majesty's Ministers: The Plans which *M. Osterman* formed there with Baron *Gortz*. All these are Proceedings which the Author of the Memorial would do well to reconcile with the Engagements which his Czarish Majesty entered into by the Alliance of 1715. That Alliance concerned his *Britannick* Majesty no otherwise than in the Quality of Elector. *Great Britain* had no Share in it; it was neither in Alliance with the Czar, nor in War with *Sweden*. The Fleets which it sent into the *Baltick*, went not beyond protecting the Nation's Commerce, without giving the Czar the least Reason of Complaint or Jealousy: Yet if the Conduct of the *Russian* Court, during the said
four

four Years be examined, it appears that no more Regard was shewn to the King than the Elector. One finds direct Intrigues with the Pretender; his Ministers admitted to *Petersbourg*; their Memorials received; their Projects supported and encouraged; the late Duke of *Ormond* protected at *Mittau*; and the Expedition against *Norway* concerted with his *Swedish* Majesty, to proceed afterwards to the Invasion of *Scotland*. One finds at the same Time, Projects of an Engagement between the Czar and the King of *Spain*; Offers of Offensive Alliances made to his Catholick Majesty; and an intimate Friendship and Correspondence established between the Ministers of the two Courts at the *Hague*. One finds the Plans of his *Britannick* Majesty, the most glorious, and most beneficial to *Europe*, traversed in all Courts by the Czar's Ministers; the Regent dissuaded from signing the Quadruple Alliance; the States General diverted from acceding to it; the Commerce of *Great Britain* disturbed; its Subjects molested in the Czar's Dominions; their Merchant-Ships seized and confiscated; and last of all, a Protestant Kingdom laid waste by Fire, and upon the Point of being subdued, had not his *Britannick* Majesty interposed with his Assistance. You have here, Sir, an Enumeration of those Benefits, which the printed Memorial assures you the Czar has heaped on his Majesty.

WHAT follows in the Memorial has no better Ground. It is pretended that his *Britannick* Majesty is beholden to his Czarish Majesty's Instances with the King of *Denmark*, for the Acquisition of *Bremen* and *Verden*; though it is notorious that the *Muscovite* Court made those Instances merely for their own Sake, and for their sole Interest: For as they were endeavouring at that Time to engage the King, in the Quality of Elector, into a Treaty of Guaranty, for securing to his Czarish Majesty the Conquests he had made upon *Sweden*, particularly *Revel*, it was proper to shew great Earnestness for procuring him *Bremen* and *Verden*. But soon after they began to alter their Conduct, and to talk in another Strain; for when they thought themselves pretty sure of inducing the King of *Sweden* to make a separate Peace, they offered him, in order the better to prevail upon him, all manner of Assistance for retaking what his *Britannick* Majesty withheld from him. This is evident from Baron *Gortz's* Plans; and it is very extraordinary to hear the Author of the Memorial pretend, that his *Britannick* Majesty is beholden to the Czar for an Acquisition, which his Czarish Majesty has long shewn a Design to wrest from him, and taken Measures with the King of *Sweden* to that End.

THE Memorial afterwards draws on a very odious and offensive Parallel between the Conduct observed by King *William* and Queen *Anne* of glorious Memory, with regard to the Czar, and that

that which is imputed to King *George*. I am persuaded the Czar would take it very ill, if his Predecessors were thus applauded at his Expence, and if their Actions were set off by being placed in Opposition to his: Yet as he is absolute in his own Dominions, such a Parallel would not be able to do him any Prejudice: But in a Country where the Government is such as it is known to be in *Great Britain*, such Insinuations in a Piece design'd to be made publick, (as we see this Memorial was) are a tacit Appeal to the Nation, tending to persuade them how different the present Reign is from the two last, and how little Care is taken to avoid Occasions of War, and to make Commerce flourish. But to throw down all this Machine at once, it is sufficient to ask the Author of this Memorial, whether King *William* and Queen *Anne* had the same Causes of Complaint against the Czar, as has his Majesty now reigning? And as it is certain they had not, all his Parallel vanishes into Smoak.

THE Memorial proceeds next to the Negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce begun at *London* in the Year 1716, by Prince *Kourakin*. It is pretended that this was obstructed by the Interests of the Nobility of *Mecklenburg*, which the Memorial says came a-cross it: As to which be it observed, that here is an Anachronism; for the Negotiation about Commerce was enter'd upon at *London* by Prince *Kourakin* in the Months of *January* and *February* 1716, and remained wholly suspended and undetermined, that Prince having not given satisfactory Declarations, and he himself leaving *London* without concluding any thing, before there was any Question about the Affairs of *Mecklenburg*, and before the Czar had sent his Troops into that Dutchy, which was not till the Month of *May* 1716. The Czar passed over afterwards into *Zealand* with his Army, for the pretended Descent on *Schonen*, and it was not till his Return into *Mecklenburg* in the Month of *October*, that he established himself entirely there, and declared directly for the Duke against the Nobility; at which Time the Negotiation of Prince *Kourakin* had lain dead above six Months. The Truth is, one must be ignorant of the Constitution of *Great Britain*, and of the Nature of its Government, to imagine that the *British* Ministers would reject a Treaty of Commerce beneficial to the Nation, for Interests so far out of the Way as those of the Nobility of *Mecklenburg*. Prince *Kourakin's* Treaty came to nothing, for three Reasons; the first was, that he insisted the *British* Merchants should be excluded from the Commerce of *Casan* and *Astracan*, though the Privilege of trading thither had been granted them by his Czarish Majesty's Predecessors: The second was, that the Czar reserved to himself the Power of raising or lowering the Coin in his Dominions at his Pleasure, which might have made the Duties payable by the *British* Merchants double to what was settled by the

Treaties, unless it had been provided against by an express Article: The third Reason was, that the Czar would never hear of concluding the Treaty of Commerce, without concluding at the same Time with his *Britannick* Majesty a Defensive Alliance, which his Czarish Majesty proposed so extensively, that it could not have failed to engage the Crown of *Great Britain* in an open Rupture with *Sweden*. The Czar stuck so firmly to this last Article, that when the Resident *Jefferyes* spoke to his Ministers in *January* 1719, of the same Treaty of Commerce, he received this plain Answer, That before that was to be thought of, it was necessary to conclude an Alliance, and to agree upon a Plan of Operations; after which they might proceed to a Treaty of Commerce, not however upon the Foot proposed in *England* in 1716, but on a more equitable Foot.

WHAT follows of the sinister Insinuations which it is pretended his *Britannick* Majesty caused to be made in the several Courts against the Interests of the Czar, is nothing but an Artifice to disguise what his own Ministers did at the Courts of *France* and *Spain*, at the *Hague*, and elsewhere, against his Majesty's Interests and Negotiations: But nothing is more strange than what the Memorial has the Assurance to assert of his *Britannick* Majesty's labouring with the Czar at *Copenhagen*, in 1716, to divert the Court of *Denmark* from the Measures taken with his Czarish Majesty for the Operations against *Sweden*; for no body is ignorant, that all the Objections against the Descent on *Sebonen* were raised solely by the Czar, and it is since known that he never really intended to make that Descent.

THE Memorial adds, that at that Time it was brought to the Point of causing Admiral *Norris* to act hostily against his Czarish Majesty's Fleet, and against his Land-Forces, if his *Danish* Majesty would only have consented to it. This is certainly a very heavy Imputation, if it had any Ground: But I can assure the Author of the Memorial, that nothing in the World was ever further from the Truth. Admiral *Norris* had never any such Orders: He never made any such Propositions to the *Danes*: And tho' it would have been easy for him to obstruct the landing of the *Russians* in *Mecklenburg*, he remained quiet with the Fleet in the Port of *Copenhagen*, having even taken from the Czar, the 22d of *October*, (as we have already said) a Memorial concerning the Operations of the following Campaign, to be sent to his *Britannick* Majesty.

THE Memorial treats the Reproaches of his Czarish Majesty's Correspondence with the Pretender and his Emissaries, as false Pretexes and mere Forgeries. It is not enough to say that those Facts were denied in a Memorial presented in 1717 to his *Britannick* Majesty by the Czar's Resident: But the Point is to destroy the incontrollable Proofs there are of those Facts, of which
nothing

nothing has been asserted in this Letter but what is ready to be justified and to be made out with the utmost Evidence.

The Memorial wonders that the Negotiation of M. *Tolstoy* at the *Hague*, and at *Hanover*, in 1717, had not a happy Success, and imputes it once more to the Interests of the Nobility of *Mecklenburg*. All this drops of itself, if it be considered, that the Negotiations of that Minister related only to the Evacuation of *Mecklenburg*; and though he agreed in general, that it ought to be done, he constantly refused to fix a Term for the March of the *Russian* Troops; which sufficiently demonstrated the little Sincerity of his Proceedings, and the little Regard he had to the just Instances of his *Britannick* Majesty.

THE little Success of the Overtures which were made to the Czar at *Amsterdam* by Admiral *Norris* and Mr. *Whitworth*, is by the Memorial imputed to their want of Instructions; but Care is taken not to tell us, that the Czar insisted with them upon a Squadron of 15 Men of War in the *Baltick*, and that this Squadron should be under the Orders of his Czarish Majesty's Admirals, which was casting an invincible Obstacle and Affront in the Way of all Concert, and of all Plans of Operations.

WE are now come, Sir, to that Part of the Memorial which speaks of the famous Congress at *Aland*. It is known that Congress was the Fruit of the Interview at *Loo* with Baron *Gortz*, and of the Resolution which the Czar then took to make a separate Peace; and yet the Memorial tells us, that this Congress was consented to, only for hearing the Propositions of the *Swedes*, and for attaining a general Peace.

CERTAINLY had that been the Design, they would not with so much Obstinacy have refused to admit to the Conferences the Ministers of their *Britannick* and *Polish* Majesties. The Minister of *Denmark* in particular had never acted in any manner that could render him suspected to the *Muscovite* Court, and yet in the very Heat of the Diversion which his Master was making in 1719, on the Side of *Stromstat*, they continued to refuse to admit him.

BUT nothing displays so much Light over this part of the Memorial, as the Plans of M. *Osterman* and Baron *Gortz*, inserted above. It is there manifest, that his Czarish Majesty had excited the King of *Sweden* to undertake the Expedition against *Norway*, promising to assist him in it, if it were necessary, by Force of Arms, or at least not to disturb him in it by any Diversion, and to give him Opportunity to employ all his Forces in it. It is there likewise we find the Project for his *Swedish* Majesty's entering *Futland*, while the *Russians* should attack the Country of *Hanover*. It was not natural therefore to let the Envoy of *Denmark* into a Congress, where such Plans against the King his Master were in Agitation, and where he would have

discovered them. It was much more proper to leave him at *Revel*, where the Foreign Ministers were less informed, and consequently less active than at *Petersburg*. And after the Death of his *Swedish* Majesty, the Design being formed to overpower *Sweden* to force it to consent to Peace with the Czar, in Exclusion of his *Danish* Majesty (as was offered to the *Swedes* by the *Muscovite* Court) it was proper also then to keep aloof from *Aland* his *Danish* Majesty's Minister.

THE same Reason made it necessary not to receive his *Britannick* Majesty's Minister there; for it was not their Business to let him discover any thing of those Plans which tended to carry the Fire of War into *Scotland*, and into his Majesty's Electorate.

THEY were also in the Right to keep away the Envoy of his *Polish* Majesty, that he might know nothing of the Plan by which they had agreed to re-establish *Stanislaus*, and to dismember *Poland*, to find Equivalents for the King of *Prussia*, and the Duke of *Mecklenburg*.

THEY would not therefore suffer at *Abo*, nor afterwards at *Aland*, any other to come near them than the King of *Prussia's* Minister only; for as they had contrived to dazzle the Eyes of that King by the Offer of an Equivalent, to induce him to restore to *Sweden* *Stetin* and its District; and as they had let him into the Plan of Execution, if not openly and offensively, at least indirectly, by obliging him to draw together his Troops in the Places where they might give Umbrage; it would have been ill becoming, and they might apprehend it would have shocked him, if they would not have suffered his Envoy at the Conferences, to which however he was not admitted till very late, and where he never made but a subordinate and very disagreeable Figure.

We have seen above the extraordinary Impatience which the Czar shewed during the Congress, to see it speedily ended by the Conclusion of his separate Peace with *Sweden*.

WE may observe the Pains he took for it, even to come in Person to *Abo* to hasten it to an Issue.

WE have seen his Uneasiness during the several Journeys Baron Gortz made to his *Swedish* Majesty, and the Disturbance which the Delay of that Baron's Return to *Aland* gave him. We have seen how much his Czarish Majesty pressed the Crown of *Sweden* to conclude with him, one while by Threats of Invasion, another by Promises of Diversion, or at least of Inaction, and another while by Ravages and by burning the Country; and all this to acquire his own separate Peace in Exclusion of his Allies, whom he took Care not to let into the Negotiation. Now is it not very pleasant, when one has all these Facts before one, to read these Words in the Memorial?

THE *Affair* had been ended long ago, while the King of Sweden was alive, could his Czarish Majesty have resolved to abandon his Allies, and to enter into the Measures which were proposed against them: But good Faith, which his Czarish Majesty esteems a principal Virtue in a great Monarch, and his Faithfulness in maintaining the Alliances he had contracted, made him absolutely reject those Measures.

WHAT is said in the Memorial of the Propositions made by the Duke of Orleans, for reuniting the Czar with his Majesty, seems very foreign to the Purpose. His Majesty never wanted to be solicited by a third Person, to live in good Intelligence with the Czar. It is what he always desired, and always sought. And as to the Conduct of his Royal Highness the Regent, with Respect to the Czar, all that is publicly known, is, that that Prince generously rejected the Offers which were made him in 1717, to send a *Muscovite* Army into the Heart of the Empire; that none disapproved more than he the Stay of the *Muscovite* Troops in *Mecklenburg*; that he earnestly pressed the Czar to withdraw them from thence; and that seeing Sweden in danger of being subdued, he was very ready to assist her with Subsidies, and to procure her Friends.

THE Memorial ends, as it began, with Reproaches on Account of the Alliance concluded with Sweden last Summer, and Admiral Norris's approaching *Stockholm* with the Fleet. I have clearly set forth above the Necessity of this Proceeding; it could not have been deferred without letting Sweden be subdued, or forced to accept the Conditions which the Czar would be pleased to prescribe. A General Peace was no longer the Point in Question. Sweden must either have made its separate Peace with the Czar, or with their *Britannick* and *Prussian* Majesties, exclusive of him.

THE Consequence of Peace with the Czar, was, to see the Ballance broken in the North, his Czarish Majesty absolute Master of the Commerce in the *Baltick*, and his Troops returned to the Empire under Pretext of getting restored to Sweden what the other Allies of the North withheld from it. Did it not justly become *Great Britain* (which was not engaged in the War of the North) to labour to avert such Evils, to maintain the Ballance, to protect the Commerce of the Nation, and to save a Protestant Kingdom from utter Ruin, or from Subjection to the Czar, which is little better?

THIS is what His *Britannick* Majesty has done, and he has done it with so much Prudence and Precaution, that no Hostility had been acted on his Part against his Czarish Majesty, and he remains in a Condition to offer him his Mediation.

THE Author of the Memorial inveighs indeed against this Offer with great Vehemence, and pretends that the Lord Carteret's

ret's Letter tends less to re-establish Peace, than to seek Pretexs for a Rupture.

As I have already given the Substance of that Letter, I leave it to be judged whether this Imputation has the least Ground. It is perhaps the first Time, that an Offer of Mediation has been treated as a Pretext for a Rupture. It is alledged, that his Czarish Majesty could not receive a Letter from a Minister who had no Credentials to him: This Delicacy is surprizing enough; the Kings of *Prussian* and *Denmark* had it not, having consented to treat at *Stockholm* by the Mediation of the Lord *Carteret*, though he had not any Letters of Credence to them. In plain Terms, His *Britannick* Majesty has neither Interest nor Intention to break with the Czar; it is agreeable to *Great Britain* to cultivate his Czarish Majesty's Friendship, and the Commerce of *Russia*. Upon these Considerations very many Proceedings of the *Muscovite* Court, little suitable to that Friendship, and very prejudicial to that Commerce, have been over-looked. His *Britannick* Majesty continues in the same Disposition; and his Czarish Majesty may, if he pleases, find the Effects of it, and make his use of a Mediation, which has no other Aim than the re-establishing the Tranquility of the North on reasonable Conditions.

London, Feb. 24,
1720.

I am, Sir, Your, &c.



